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This study examines the congressional mission to liberated concentration camps in April 
and May 1945. General Dwight D. Eisenhower requested a congressional mission and a 
group of newspaper editors and publishers to view firsthand the horrors of the 
concentration camp Buchenwald, so that the American public might be made more aware 
of German atrocities in concentration camps and to dispel the belief that the atrocity 
reports were wartime propaganda. The congressmen and newspapermen were horrified 
by what they saw at the German concentration camps, and many reported back to the 
American public about the atrocities and conditions in the concentration camps through 
articles, interviews, speeches, and rallies. Upon their return to the United States, the 
congressmen published a report on the conditions within the camps, and many of them 
spoke in Congress and to the public about the need to re-educate the Germans, try guilty 
Germans, and rebuild Germany. The congressmen and editors and publishers brought 
legitimacy to the reports of American war correspondents concerning German atrocities, 
and their efforts contributed to constructing a political climate that allowed for and 
legitimized the Nuremberg Trials, the U.S. Army denazification efforts, and the 
rebuilding of Germany through the Marshall Plan. To examine this mission, newspaper 
articles from April and May 1945 were collected from thirteen American newspapers, as 
well as the Times of London. Research was also conducted in the personal collections of 
two of the congressmen who toured Europe at that time, as well as at the National 
Archives in College Park, MD. This study goes beyond the existing research by 
examining the congressional mission to Buchenwald, Dora, and Dachau, which, though it 






For my wife Sara, who believed in me from the start and followed me all the way from 
Oregon to Vermont so that I could earn my Master’s in Arts at the university I most 
wanted to attend. 
 




I would like to thank Dr. Nicole Phelps, my adviser, who was of immeasurable 
help while I researched and wrote my thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Jonathan 
Huener, Dr. Alan Steinweis, and Dr. Steven Zdatny, all of whom advised me and helped 
me to hone my research and writing skills, as well as Dr. Lutz Kaelber, who chaired my 
thesis committee. Thank you to the Carolyn and Leonard Miller Center for Holocaust 
Studies for awarding me the David Scrase Student Research Grant, without which my 
research trips would have been impossible. Also, thank you to the staff of the 
Bailey/Howe Library, especially Daisy Benson, Hope Greenberg, and Scott Shafer, who 
made researching and formatting my thesis much easier through their advice. Thank you 
to Sharon and Ben of the College Park NARA photographs department; without your 
patience and understanding I would never have been able to collect all the wonderful 
photographs that are in this thesis. Thank you to all of my friends, both back home in 
Oregon and those whom I met in Vermont; without your continued support and 
encouragement this project would not have been possible. Thank you Ethan Jennings for 
showing me the way and demystifying the thesis-writing process (and for always being 
there with a beer). Thank you to my parents, who helped to pay for my undergraduate 
education and who always supported me morally (and financially). And thank you Sara 
Lindsey, my wife, for traveling three thousand miles and living under a pile of snow for 
two years just so I could study the Holocaust at the university where Raul Hilberg once 
researched and taught.  
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Dedication ........................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. iii 
Illustrations ........................................................................................................................ vi 
Investigators who Visited Germany in April and May 1945 ............................................ vii 
Preface................................................................................................................................ ix 
Section One: The Congressional Mission ........................................................................... 1 
Eisenhower and the Concentration Camps ..................................................................... 1 
“Outstanding Men” and “Trained Observers” .............................................................. 12 
The United States and Nazi Germany ........................................................................... 16 
Creating the Congressional Mission ............................................................................. 26 
The Congressional Mission to German Concentration Camps ..................................... 33 
Section Two: “Organized Crime against Civilization” ..................................................... 50 
Evidence of Atrocities................................................................................................... 50 
A Sordid and Fantastic Story ........................................................................................ 76 
A Program of Extermination? ....................................................................................... 81 
Concentration Camps versus Prisoner of War Camps .................................................. 84 
Reporting on Atrocities and other Conditions .............................................................. 90 
What Should be Done with Germany? ......................................................................... 96 
v 
 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 101 
Notes on Photographs and Map ...................................................................................... 112 
Bibliography: .................................................................................................................. 113 







1. Congressmen view corpses at Buchenwald, April 24, 1945, ix 
2. Congressmen arrive in Paris, France, April 24, 1945, 34 
3. Congressmen view prisoner demonstration, April 24, 1945, 35 
4. Editors and publishers view corpses at Buchenwald, April 25, 1945, 36 
5. General Dwight D. Eisenhower greets congressmen in Paris, France, April 25,  
1945, 38 
 
6. Congressmen view the Dora V-2 and V-2 bomb factory, Nordhausen, Germany,  
May 1, 1945, 40 
 
7. Rep. John Vorys views a Dachau incinerator, May 2, 1945, 42 
8. M. E. Walter tours Dachau barracks, May 3, 1945, 44 
9. Congressmen view the Dachau hospital, May 2, 1945, 57 
10. Sen. Alben Barkley views corpses at Buchenwald, April 24, 1945, 59 
11. Congressmen view Buchenwald sleeping conditions, April 24, 1945, 61 
12. Rep. John Vorys views Dachau barracks, May 2, 1945, 63 
13. Congressmen view Dachau gas chamber, May 2, 1945, 67 
14. Rep. John Vorys views corpses at Dachau, May 2, 1945, 69 
15. Congressmen view remains in the Buchenwald crematorium, April 24, 1945, 72 
16. Former Buchenwald prisoners exhibit human remains, April 16, 1945, 74 
17. Congressmen interview Colonel Paul Good, May 3, 1945, 88 
Maps: 
1. U.S. Army Visitor’s Bureau itinerary map of the congressional tour, 46 
vii 
 
Investigators who Visited Germany in April and May 1945 
Senators and Congressmen who Inspected German Concentration Camps 
Senator Alben W. Barkley (D-KY), Senate Majority Leader 
 
Senator Charles W. Brooks (R-IL)  
 
Senator Walter F. George (D-GA), Acting chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
 
Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA)  
 
Senator Elbert D. Thomas (D-UT), Chairman of the Committee on Military 
Affairs 
 
Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE), Republican Whip 
 
Representative Edouard V. Izac (D-CA) 
 
Representative James W. Mott (R-OR) 
 
Representative James P. Richards (D-SC) 
 
Representative Dewey J. Short (R-MO) 
 
Representative Robert E. Thomason (D-TX) 
 
Representative John M. Vorys (R-OH) 
 
Newspaper and Magazine Editors and Publishers who Inspected German 
Concentration Camps 
 
Julius Ochs Adler, New York Times 
 
Malcolm Bingay, Detroit Free Press 
 
Amon Carter, Fort Worth Star-Telegram 
 
Norman Chandler, Los Angeles Times 
 
William L. Chenery, Collier’s 
 




John Randolph Hearst, Hearst Newspapers 
 
Ben Hibbs, Saturday Evening Post 
 
Stanley High, Reader’s Digest 
 
Ben McKelway, Washington Star 
 
William I. Nicholson, New Orleans Times-Picayune 
 
Joseph Pulitzer Jr., St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
 
Gideon Seymour, Minneapolis Star Journal 
 
Duke Shoop, Kansas City Star 
 
Beverly W. Smith, American Magazine 
 
Walker Stone, Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance and Washington Daily News 
 







Preface: The members of the congressional mission to Nazi concentration camps in April 
and May 1945 view bodies at the Buchenwald concentration camp, April 24, 1945. The 
congressional mission to the concentration camps corresponds with a turning point in 
how the American public viewed Germany. Although reports of German atrocities had 
been coming to the United States since the early years of the war, many Americans 
doubted their veracity. The congressmen returned from the camps to tell Americans that 
what they had read in the newspapers was entirely true: the Germans had committed war 
crimes on an incredible scale. Their report to Congress, interviews, and public speeches 
added legitimacy to the correspondents’ reports and helped to convince and prepare 
Congress and the American public to take a larger role in Europe after the war, through 
denazification efforts, trials of Nazi criminals, and especially the Marshall Plan. Although 
the congressional visit to these liberated concentration camps has received brief mention 
in existing literature, it has never before been fully examined. This study provides a more 
in-depth examination of the purpose and effects of the congressional mission, as well as a 
detailed account of the mission and the reports produced by the congressmen and editors 
and publishers who toured Buchenwald, Dora, and Dachau in April and May 1945. 
Photograph 1: National Archives RG-111-SC-204746, Box 266. 
1 
 
Section One: The Congressional Mission  
In April and May 1945, twelve members of Congress, six senators and six 
representatives, representing both sides of the aisle, traveled to Europe at General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower’s invitation to see for themselves the atrocities and conditions in German 
concentration camps. What they saw convinced them that the Nazi
1
 government had 
engaged in the deliberate mistreatment of its political and racial opponents through a 
program the congressmen later described as “a systematic form of torture and death.”2  
Eisenhower and the Concentration Camps 
By April 1945, the American and British armies were advancing quickly into 
Germany from the west. The landing at Normandy had been a triumphant success, and 
although the Battle of the Bulge slowed the Allied advance for a time, it could not stop 
the momentum of the Allied armies. During their rapid push to meet the Soviets in 
Germany, Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.’s Third Army encountered the first 
German concentration camps. Although the Soviets had already liberated Majdanek, on 
the outskirts of Lublin, Poland, more than half a year earlier, the liberation of Ohrdruf 
and Buchenwald gave the American army its first glimpse of the concentration camp 
system. 
The U.S. Army liberated Ohrdruf, a subsidiary camp of the Buchenwald 
concentration camp, near the German city of Gotha on April 4, 1945. After liberating 
                                                 
1
 Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or National Socialist German Workers' Party, 
abbreviated NSDAP and commonly called the Nazi Party. 
2
 United States Senate, Atrocities and Other Conditions in Concentration Camps in Germany, (S. Doc. 79-
47) Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1945, 1, 14. 
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Ohrdruf, Patton was so overwhelmed by the scope of the camp that he invited 
Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in the European Theater of Operations General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower to tour the camp and see the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis 
against their political prisoners.  
On April 12 Eisenhower viewed his first concentration camp; he spent the day 
touring the camp with Patton, and what he saw and heard “etched the date in my 
memory.... I have never felt able to describe my emotional reactions when I first came 
face to face with indisputable evidence of Nazi brutality and ruthless disregard of every 
shred of decency.” Eisenhower “visited every nook and cranny” of Ohrdruf so that he 
might testify firsthand in the future, “in case there ever grew up at home the belief or 
assumption that ‘the stories of Nazi brutality were just propaganda.’” He later wrote that, 
“[u]p to that time I had known about [concentration camps] only generally or through 
secondary sources. I am certain, however, that I have never at any other time experienced 
an equal sense of shock.”3  
Three days later, on Sunday, April 15, Patton wrote Eisenhower again, this time 
concerning Buchenwald, which the Third Army had liberated on April 11. He told 
Eisenhower that Buchenwald had a larger population than Ohrdruf, that one hundred 
prisoners were dying per day, and that the crematorium was “far superior” to that of 
Ohrdruf. In the letter, Patton told Eisenhower that he had requested “the press to go up 
there and see it, and then write as much about it as they could.” He had also contacted 
General Omar N. Bradley the night before to recommend that Eisenhower send “selected 
                                                 
3
 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1948), 408, 409. 
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individuals from the upper strata of the press to look at [Buchenwald], so that you can 
build up another page of the necessary evidence as to the brutality of the Germans.”4 For 
Patton and Eisenhower it was necessary that Americans read accurate reports of the 
atrocities and conditions in German concentration camps, so that following the war 
Americans would be interested in maintaining a presence in Germany for denazification 
and war crimes trials. Eisenhower urged Patton in his reply to ensure that “every visitor 
coming into that region … be urged to see the place”5; Patton took Eisenhower’s advice 
even further: he invited thousands of American soldiers to Buchenwald to see the 
“Dantesque scene of human woe and to listen … to the tales of men who had lived 
through things that shouldn’t be allowed in hades.”6 Hundreds of British and American 
soldiers came to see the camp daily, “to see the living dead and be convinced that the 
report of Nazi atrocities is not just propaganda.”7 Patton also compelled the citizens of 
Weimer to walk to Buchenwald and tour the camp to “see for themselves the horrors of 
the Nazi regime.”8  
The Times of London believed that Patton had taken the “proper course” in his 
decision to bring the citizens of the nearby city of Weimar to Buchenwald, because for 
“many years the Nazi leaders have denounced as lying hostile propaganda the stories 
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 General George S. Patton Jr. to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 15, 1945, Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Presidential Archives, Abilene, KS, retrieved from http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/ 
online_documents/holocaust/1945_04_15_Patton_to_DDE.pdf. 
5
 General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George S. Patton, Jr., April 18, 1945, Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Presidential Archives, Abilene, KS, retrieved from  http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/ 
online_documents/holocaust/1945_04_18_DDE_to_Patton.pdf. 
6
 William H. Stoneman, “Yank Soldiers View Horrors of Huge Nazi Prison Camp,” Boston Daily Globe, 
evening ed., April 23, 1945, 4. 
7
 Don Whitehead, “Proof of Nazi Horrors Shown to Congressmen,” LA Times, April 23, 1945, 5. 
8
 “General Patton Forces Weimar Germans to View Murder Camp Horrors,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 
20, 1945, 2A. 
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about the concentration camps that became known to the outside world.” The Times 
suggested that many Germans may have believed the Nazi leadership claims of 
propaganda, and that it was necessary for those claims to be proven false. According to 
the Times, this was “the beginning of the re-education of Germany.”9 
After reading Patton’s letter concerning Buchenwald, Eisenhower decided 
something had to be done to inform the American public about German “bestiality and 
cruelty,” to make the public believe that the stories coming back from American war 
correspondents in Europe were true and not just wartime anti-German propaganda. To 
this effect Eisenhower cabled Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, asking 
him to invite twelve members of Congress and a group of prominent newspaper and 
magazine editors and publishers to come to Germany to see for themselves the “practices 
of the Germans in these camps.”10 
It was with German re-education in mind, along with the rebuilding of Germany 
and war crimes trials, that Eisenhower conceived of a congressional mission to tour 
Buchenwald. Eisenhower knew that a similar peace to that which followed the First 
World War could lead to yet another war, so he envisioned a different peace. To achieve 
this goal, he realized that he would need the support of Congress, which controlled the 
U.S. federal budget. For the United States to maintain the necessary military presence to 
oversee German re-education, rebuilding, and war crimes trials, Congress would need to 
believe all three to be necessary.   
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 “The Victims,” Times (London), April 20, 1945, 5. 
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 General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, April 19, 1945, Dwight D. Eisenhower 




It was not just access to the congressional purse, however, that Eisenhower 
wanted from Congress; he invited newspaper and magazine editors and publishers in 
addition to the congressional committee because he wanted to legitimize the atrocity 
news that was already being read by Americans at home; that legitimacy would help to 
build public support for war crimes trials abroad. Eisenhower knew that many Americans 
were skeptical of the war crimes claims; after all, similar claims had been made following 
the First World War, and after investigation they were proven false. Also, Americans 
were simply having a hard time believing something so terrible could actually happen—
that these crimes could actually be committed by a “civilized” nation such as Germany 
was a difficult pill to swallow. Photographs of the atrocities went a long way to 
convincing the skeptics, but for the public to believe the truth of the atrocity stories, the 
photos needed to be backed by the assurances of respected congressmen and editors and 
publishers.  
The American public had been reading about antisemitic activity in Germany 
since 1933, after Adolf Hitler became chancellor, and stories about German atrocities 
during the war had made their way to the United States as well. American reporters and 
diplomats had been stationed in Germany for a long time, and a good deal of information 
about the activities in Germany had been transmitted to the United States.
11
 Many 
American reporters sent back details about persecution of the Jews, book burnings, and 
the purging of the universities, and many were sent home by the Nazi regime for 
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 Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew 





 But many newsmen did not report on what was happening to the 
Jews; they favored telling Americans less to maintain morale at home.
13
 Generally, the 
American press was tolerated in Germany until the United States entered the war, at 




Because the British intelligence office had been successful in breaking enemy 
codes, the British government knew far more about Nazi war crimes than did Roosevelt 
and his government. When British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was first lord of the 
admiralty in World War I he had been closely tied to the code breakers, and after the war 
he maintained his connections. Additionally, in 1939, the Polish secret service duplicated 
Germany’s Enigma machine and supplied one to Britain, so British code breakers were 
reading German orders as early as September 1939.
15
 
Their reports, however, only grasped a fraction of what was going on, but they did 
include information about mass killings directed by higher Schutzstaffel (SS) leaders.
16
 
Between August 23 and 31, 1940, British decoders noted that 12,361 Jews had been 
killed by the SS and Order Police, and that the actual number was probably double that, 
according to a September 12 summary, because they could only decode about half of the 
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 Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: A “Special Relationship”? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), 121. 
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 Four months before the January 20, 1942 Wannsee Conference, at which the 
“Final Solution to the Jewish Problem” was discussed and set in motion, British 
intelligence had a “basic grasp of Nazi intentions toward Jews in the Soviet territories.”18 
Despite this abundance of evidence, intelligence officers were preoccupied with 
the war, not the beginning of the Holocaust. Although the British Ministry of Information 
had begun special “Reports on Jewry,” in which they concluded that the “Germans 
clearly pursue a policy of extermination against the Jews [and] the only things Jewish that 
will remain in Poland will be Jewish cemeteries,” this information was not well known 
outside of MI 8 (British signals intelligence), and some specialists in MI 14 (British 




During the war, many U.S. administrators and officials did not have sufficient 
evidence of the Final Solution because British intelligence was not sharing its 
information on the Holocaust. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which had less 
reliable information (and less information overall) than London, was still able to get an 
accurate picture of the Final Solution, but probably not until late in 1942. Concerning the 
reports of Nazi atrocities in 1942, Allen Dulles, who would later head the OSS, suggested 
the creation of a tribunal from Allied and neutral nations to examine evidence of Nazi 
violence after the war, but no action was to be taken by the military to rescue Jews. 
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 Although the persecution and attempted genocide of the European Jews is central to the story of Nazi 
Germany and the Holocaust, it will not be a major focus here. The concentration camps visited by the 
congressional delegation were not central in the extermination of Europe’s Jews, but were places for 
internment of political opponents and/or slave labor. 
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 Breitman, Official Secrets, 96, 97. 
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 Ibid., 101. 
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During the war, U.S. and British military leaders chose to focus on what they believed to 
be the more important issues of military and diplomatic strategy and the Allied 
partnership, rather than with specific decisions about the rescue of Jews. The leadership 
of both the United States and Great Britain had decided that dealing with German war 
crimes would have to wait until after the end of the war.
 20
 
Although reports of persecution of German Jews had been present in American 
and British newspapers since 1933, and stories about the mass murder of Jews had been 
making their way out of the East since 1941, rumors and reports of what would later be 
known as the Holocaust went largely ignored in the West. There are four important 
reasons why people in the West, most notably in the United States and Great Britain, did 
not believe the atrocity reports that came out in World War II: 1) atrocity propaganda 
from World War I, which was used to spur outrage among the Entente, was proven after 
the war to be false, making people less likely to believe news of new atrocities; 2) the 
crimes of the Holocaust were so unbelievable that people could not really understand or 
“know” them until they saw them personally or in photographs21; 3) reports on Nazi 
antisemitic actions in Germany before the war had been played down or suppressed in 
Western newspapers and magazines; and 4) Allied antisemitism and xenophobia made 
Americans less sympathetic to Jewish and foreign victims. 
In order to gain support for post-war trials and the rebuilding and re-education of 
Germany, Eisenhower needed to change the minds of the American public and the U.S. 
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 Ibid., 144, 231, 131, 228. 
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 Ibid., 8, 9. 
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government; he needed them  not only to believe the reports of German atrocities, but 
also to believe that Germany could be “fixed.” Eisenhower needed to overcome a U.S. 
isolationist movement that had become strong following the First World War. 
Isolationism had been so strong in the United States that, although President Roosevelt 
recognized the dangers of Nazism early on, he followed British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill’s lead and favored appeasement in international policy toward Germany.  
The relationship between Nazi Germany and the United States began civilly. 
Hitler did not want to antagonize Roosevelt because early in the 1930s the United States 
was still a valuable economic ally, and many in the United States supported Hitler and his 
regime as a stabilizing power in Europe. Some Americans were uncomfortable with the 
rumors coming out of Germany concerning the oppression of Germany’s Jews and 
Hitler’s political opponents, but many in America believed that as Germany recovered 
from the Depression the Nazis would relax some of their more oppressive measures. 
German propaganda had convinced America, and it was not until the war broke out in 
1939 that U.S. opinion would turn against Germany.
22
 
As the 1930s progressed, Hitler broke more and more of the stipulations of the 
Versailles Treaty, the peace treaty that had ended the war with Germany. Many in the 
United States and Great Britain felt that the Versailles Treaty had been unfair and were 
therefore willing to forgive Germany for breaking the Versailles restrictions. Also, the 
Great Depression was not a time when Great Britain or France could afford to spend 
money to enforce the treaty through military means. The British government hoped that 
                                                 
22
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Hitler would become more reasonable after each time he violated the treaty, but he 
continued to seek more, and more was given in hopes that it would be the last thing he 
took. Because Great Britain was one of the only countries that could enforce the treaty, 
their policy led other governments to follow suit, and appeasement of Germany became 
the international response to German demands.
23
 
Germany’s steady rearmament went against the Locarno Treaties, which had 
secured European non-aggression and economic cooperation, and the Versailles Treaty, 
neither of which were signed by representatives of the United States, so the U.S. was not 
obligated to confront Germany. Neither Great Britain nor France were in a position to 
enforce the treaties, so Hitler was able to slowly build up Germany’s forces, facing no 
opposition when Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring declared on March 9, 1935, that 
Germany had an air force, or even when conscription was instituted on March 16, 1935, 
and Hitler announced that he would build Germany’s armed forces to thirty-six divisions, 
approximately a half million men.
24
  
On September 1, 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, it was clear that 
appeasement had failed as a strategy to placate Germany and avoid war. The policy of 
appeasement had allowed Hitler to rebuild the German armed forces without any serious 
consequences, and after Germany’s army had been rebuilt, appeasement allowed him to 
annex Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia with little resistance.  
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11 
 
Isolationists in the United States had pressured Presidents Woodrow Wilson and 
Calvin Coolidge not to sign the Versailles or Locarno Treaties, respectively, and because 
the United States was not tied in to politics in Europe, Hitler was allowed to expand his 
power unchecked. It was partially in answer to this isolationist sentiment in the United 
States that General Eisenhower invited members of Congress and the editors and 
publishers of American newspapers and magazines to view the newly liberated 
concentration camps in Germany. Eisenhower believed that America needed to maintain 
a military and political presence in Germany after the war to avoid a similar collapse in 
international relations by reintegrating Germany into the larger European community, by 
helping to rebuild and re-educate Germany, and punishing war criminals. 
In the minds of Marshall and Eisenhower, the failed World War I peace and 
Versailles Treaty contributed considerably to the success of Hitler and the Nazis, as well 
as to the outbreak of World War II. Both men believed that to avoid a third world war, a 
different peace would need to be made at the end of the war; a peace wherein Germany 
was reintegrated into Europe economically, where the German people were successfully 
denazified, and where Nazi criminals paid for their crimes. After representative Clare 
Booth Luce (R-CT) returned from visiting Buchenwald on April 21, 1945, she spoke to 
this exact sentiment: “Unless a punishment commensurate with the crimes committed is 
meted out,” she told a crowd at Carnegie Hall on May 22, “I warn that again before 25 
years have elapsed this same people will plunge the world into a holocaust infinitely 
12 
 
greater than the one we are now passing through.” 25  To help create such a peace, 
Eisenhower knew that Congress and the American public would need to back Army 
efforts, and to secure that support Eisenhower called on Congress to send a delegation of 
investigators to Europe in April and May 1945. 
“Outstanding Men” and “Trained Observers” 
Paul Wooton wrote in the Times-Picayune after the return of the delegations from 
Germany that Marshall and Eisenhower “are being given credit for unusual perception in 
arranging for editors, publishers, legislators and other reputable persons to view German 
atrocities at first hand.” Marshall and Eisenhower, according to Wooton, believed that a 
hard peace with Germany was essential in discouraging “a philosophy that is inconsistent 
with the kind of world the peace-loving nations want,” and he hoped that the reports 
produced concerning the trip would “curb any maudlin sympathy for the perpetrators of 
the greatest crime of history.” Wooton also mentioned the false war crimes charges of 
World War I and how those false charges could open the door for the claim that the 
current war crime charges were also propaganda.
26
 
General Eisenhower described it as “vitally important” that enough testimony 
“from people who would be believed” came back to the United States from the 
concentration camps. Wooton explained that “[b]y bringing the atrocities to the personal 
attention of outstanding men, who are trained observers, the character of these outrages 
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could be established beyond all doubt.” 27  When Eisenhower met the congressional 
mission for lunch at the Hotel Lion d’Or in Paris on April 25, he told them that although 
at that time they had only seen one camp, Buchenwald, there were many others. He told 
them, their “responsibilities, I believe, extend into a great field, and informing the people 
at home of things like these atrocities is one of them…. I want you to see for yourselves 
and be the [spokesmen] for the United States.”28 Eisenhower wanted trusted experts, 
individuals whom the American public would believe, to see the concentration camps and 
report on the condition of the camps and the prisoners within. 
After seeing Buchenwald, the editors and publishers agreed with Eisenhower and 
believed that even more trusted experts should visit the camps. Norman Chandler of the 
LA Times wrote that the group was so shocked by what they saw that they cabled 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on April 28 to urge him to send yet another group to 
tour the camps, “this time the clergy of all denominations.” Chandler wrote that he 
wished every American could see what he and the others saw while touring the 
concentration camps so that all Americans could have a “complete understanding” of the 
nature of the Nazi enemy, and one could argue that a clerical visit to the concentration 
camps would have a similar effect as a congressional and editorial visit—many 
Americans look to religious leaders as moral and cultural authorities in their lives and 
would value their opinions on German war crimes.
29
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What Eisenhower wanted was a group of men and women whom the public 
would trust to report accurately about the veracity of war crimes claims. For the United 
States to remain involved in German affairs, including the trial of German war criminals, 
the American public needed to know the truth about the conditions in the concentration 
camps so that they would support whatever needed to be done with Germany following 
the war. 
On the afternoon of April 20, Colonel William Arthur of General Marshall’s staff 
called M. E. Walter to tell him that the Houston Chronicle had been selected to send a 
representative to Europe. “We want to give editors of the leading newspapers and 
magazines of the nation a first-hand view of the situation in Germany,” Arthur explained 
in his call. “The War Department feels that a personal inspection trip will enable the 
editors to appreciate better the fighting front reports of their correspondents, and to apply 
these reports more intelligently in their editorials,” which in turn would drum up support 
for continued military presence in Germany.
30
  
Duke Shoop wrote in the Kansas City Star that Eisenhower was shocked by what 
he saw in the concentration camps. He remembered the atrocity stories of the previous 
war, tales “such as amputations of the hands of little children” that did not stand up under 
the “demand for real evidence and documentation.” Eisenhower, according to Shoop, 
remembered that the American people “adopted an easy attitude toward the Germans 
[after World War I]. So he invited members of Congress and newspaper and magazine 
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men to see the same brutalities that had shocked him,” in an effort to prove the validity of 
the current war crimes claims.
31
 
Walter explained the understandable skepticism of the American public 
concerning atrocity stories coming back from war correspondents in Germany. “In the 
last war,” he wrote, “so many atrocity stories were disproved after peace had been 
declared that people became skeptical, and when stories began coming back on the horror 
camps maintained by the Nazis there was some doubt.” Walter wrote that Eisenhower 
believed that doubt could be laid to rest if respected editors and publishers from 
throughout the nation saw the crimes of the Nazi regime for themselves; then, there 
would be no questioning the atrocities in the following years.
32
 
In April 1945, as concentration camps were overrun by the American and British 
armies, more news, accompanied now by photographs, began to appear in American 
newspapers. In the April 20 Christian Science Monitor, Peter Lyne reported that, 
although the previous Russian reports of German atrocities in Eastern Europe from 
Russian and Polish witnesses were only “half believed” during the war, “now the United 
States and Britain can add to their testimony in factual evidence.”33 On the same day, the 
Times of London stated that reports of “cruelties perpetrated in the political concentration 
camps” as told by German, Jewish, Russian, and Polish witnesses, which in the past had 
been dismissed as “hallucinations” because it was difficult “to imagine a degradation of 
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the soul that descend so far below the animal level of cruelty,” were legitimized as 
photographs “remove[d] the last possibility of doubt.”34 
The United States and Nazi Germany 
As early as the beginning of 1933, news about the political oppression of 
Communists and other political opponents of the Nazis had come into the United States 
from American correspondents in Germany. News about the persecution of Jews was 
only part of the story about Nazi Germany and was not central to the reports coming from 
the correspondents. Of more interest to the reporters was news about the political 
upheaval in Germany. Hitler’s seizure of power, violence against political opponents, the 
March elections, and the Reichstag fire occupied substantial space in their reports, while 
violence against the Jews was given less attention. The way that the American press 
told—or did not tell—the story of antisemitism in Germany worked to shape American 
reaction to the persecution. The press, though ostensibly objective, was not neutral in 
reporting persecution, and Americans did not get a complete picture of the Nazi 
persecution policies. Also, in the early months of the Nazi regime, United States 
diplomats urged American correspondents in Germany to “moderate the tenor of their 
dispatches, lest public opinion [turn] against Germany.” This was done with an eye to 
protecting the favorable relations between the German and American governments and is 
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important when considering what the American public knew about the abuse of Nazi 
political opponents and German Jews.
35
  
In 1933, papers such as the Chicago Tribune, New York Times, and London Daily 
Herald all carried reports that the Nazis were planning to massacre their political 
opponents and Jews, but many in America were skeptical. Many other papers and 
magazines “were convinced that the situation could not be as bad as the reporters 
contended,” and labeled such reports as exaggeration. The idea that reporters were 
exaggerating mistreatment in Germany was much easier to accept for the American 
public than the reality that Germany, a “modern” nation, was engaging in such brutal 
persecution. And because American correspondents in Berlin reported often on how they 
were courteously treated in Germany and how the German people seemed happy and 




The German government also worked hard to influence the American press. 
Norman Chandler, the publisher of the Los Angeles Times, who visited Germany during 
the 1936 Olympic Games “berated Ralph Barnes of the New York Herald Tribune and 
William Shirer of CBS for their critical and alarming stories on Germany.” He and the 
other businessmen with whom he toured Germany said “that they had never seen a people 
so ‘happy, content, and united.’” It was difficult for correspondents to convince those 
who did not actually witness acts of persecution and discrimination that there was more 
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to the Third Reich than its economic revival.
37
 After viewing the concentration camps for 
himself in 1945, Chandler was more than convinced; he told the United Press in an 
interview that “[w]hat we saw proved [that] our own reports during this war told the 
absolute truth without exaggeration.”38 
Many American reporters, some of whom remained in Germany until 1942, saw 
firsthand the brutalities inflicted on the Jews and political opponents of the Reich. They 
witnessed the effects of the Nuremberg Laws, the expropriation of Jewish wealth, and 
marking of Jews with a yellow star. Beginning in 1941, American correspondents often 
heard tales of “massacres of civilians” from German soldiers on leave from the Russian 
front, and many “watched as Jews were loaded onto trains for ‘resettlement’ in the east.” 
Many correspondents, however, feared that if they reported what they had seen or heard 
they would be expelled from Germany or otherwise punished. They also feared for the 
safety of their informants, who might find themselves in a concentration camp if the Nazi 
government learned that they were telling American reporters about German crimes. 
Even if they filed reports containing the gory details of persecution, the American public 
did not always read exactly what the correspondents wrote. Editors in America decided 
what was printed and where in the paper the stories would appear. Oftentimes, editors 
would cut portions of stories that they believed to be “unreliable or unbelievable.”39 
On other occasions, when American correspondents were critical of the Nazi 
regime, the German government censored their reports or expelled the journalist. 
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Journalists who wrote atrocity stories faced punishments such as having their paper’s 
reporters banned from Germany or being unable to use the German postal system. 
Naturally, correspondents tried to avoid expulsion, censorship, and especially having 
their paper banned from Germany, because it would anger their employers and could 
seriously damage their own careers. Additionally, American reports from Germany were 
often censored by the Nazi government; radio was strictly regulated, often more than 
printed reports. When reports were not censored, correspondents had to work carefully so 
that the German government did not prevent the sending of their stories. Correspondents 
in Germany feared even harsher measures than censorship or expulsion should their 
reports offend or anger the Nazi government: some reporters were arrested and held in 
Nazi prisons. The United States State Department offered no protection to correspondents 
who were expelled from Germany or locked in a German prison. The State Department 
made it clear that it “would take no action if the Nazis expelled or arrested reporters.”40 
Despite German threats, arrests, expulsions, and censorship, an “astonishing 
amount of information was available long before the end of the war,” and many aspects 
of the Nazi horrors were known before the camps were opened by the U.S. Army in 
1945. These horrors, however, were mostly viewed as exaggeration rather than an 
accurate reflection of German anti-Jewish and anti-opposition policy. Rather than 
exaggerate, however, most American correspondents were conservative in the tone of 
their reports, so as not to be accused of “fomenting hysteria.” They wrote balanced and 
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reserved reports and tended toward moderation, rather than exaggeration. Even so, their 
reports about Nazi horrors were greeted with skepticism.
41
 
A great deal of American skepticism has its origin in the false atrocity reports that 
came out of Belgium during the First World War. The Bryce Report, in particular, 
suggested that the Germans participated in the brutal killings of babies and mutilations of 
defenseless women in Belgium; these atrocities were later discovered to be fiction. The 
principal material for the report consisted of 1,200 depositions that recounted supposed 
acts of German barbarity in Belgium. Many of the depositions were made by Belgian 
refugees in Britain and by British and Belgian soldiers stationed in Britain and France. 
Lord James Bryce’s report relied almost entirely on these accounts, and he did not bother 
to fact check them because at the time Britain was trying to convince neutrals such as the 
United States to join the war, so Bryce chose to exploit any advantage he could get.
42
 
When stories of German atrocities during World War II began to make their way to back 
to American readers, they remembered the embarrassment caused by the false atrocity 
tales of World War I, and many tended to dismiss the new reports. Even reporters who 
had proof of mass killings and persecution often doubted their own stories because they 
were so similar to the false stories from the last war, and when reporters believed the 
news and reported it, those far from Germany—both editors and the public—often did 
not fully trust the reports.
43
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It was with these concerns in mind that congressmen such as Senator Charles 
Brooks (R-IL) and Representative Edouard Izac (D-CA) were selected to accompany the 
congressional mission abroad. Izac had been a prisoner of war in Germany during the 
First World War. He said that his own experiences as a German prisoner had “prepared 
him for some instances of brutality in the prison camps,” though by the end of the trip he 
said what he and the rest of the congressmen had seen “defied descriptions.”44  The 
inclusion of Brooks, “one of the leading pre-Pearl Harbor isolationists,” as a member of 
the delegation spoke to one of the main purposes of the trip: to further encourage 
American involvement abroad after the end of the war.
45
 
On December 8, 1942, almost a year after America entered the war, Roosevelt 
informed American Jewish leaders that the government had proof of the mass killings in 
Europe. American Jewish groups publicized what they knew, and the press reported what 
little news of the Holocaust it had. Although the American public knew about Jewish 
persecution from before, they comprehended little of the Holocaust. They had access to 
some facts, but facts did not necessarily mean understanding. Americans were skeptical; 




Racist attitudes in the United States also affected how much attention reports of 
antisemitic activity in Germany received. In 1920s America, race and national origin 
were important issues; people belonging to the Western European “Nordic” races were 
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valued more highly than the “undesirable races” of the East.47 To ensure that the United 
States would be populated by only “desirable races,” the 1924 National Origins Act 
imposed a cap of 150,000 immigrants per year and instituted a quota system that favored 
“desirable races.”48 The quota system stipulated that only a certain number of persons 
could emigrate to the United States from any given country. Western European countries, 
specifically Germany, Great Britain, and Ireland, were favored heavily over most other 
countries, especially Middle Eastern, Asian, and African countries.
49
 Quotas were not 
changeable between countries and the 1924 law made no official recognition of 
“refugees,” and therefore made no provision for offering asylum to the victims of 
persecution. In 1924 the country had effectively closed its doors to any more mass 
immigration.
50
 The Immigration Act of 1924 was comprised of a series of reconstructed 
racial categories, in which race and nationality—concepts that had been loosely fused 
since the nineteenth century—were separated and realigned in new ways. The law 




After the so-called Nuremberg Race Laws,
52
 which effectively made German 
Jews second class citizens, were passed in Germany in 1935, New York governor Herbert 
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Lehman proposed doubling the number of German Jews annually admitted to the United 
States, from twenty-five hundred to five thousand. President Roosevelt, however, was in 
no mood then, in the midst of the Great Depression, to change his mind and take the 
immigration barriers down. In the United States, immigration statues forbade issuing 
visas to persons who were “likely to become a public charge,” and under the 
circumstances in Nazi Germany, where Jews were being dispossessed, few German Jews 
could qualify for visas because the amount of assets they could bring out of Germany was 
strictly limited by the Nazis.
53
 During this time of economic crisis in the United States, 
the American press framed its opposition to immigration around the faltering economy 
and unemployment; the press demonized immigration as an additional burden on an 
already overburdened economy. Although many in the American press were appalled by 
German abuses of Jews, anger about the mistreatment of German Jews did not alter the 
press’ resistance to increased immigration.54 
After the German-Austrian Anschluss, the German occupation and annexation of 
Austria in 1938, Roosevelt ordered the merging of the German and Austrian quotas and 
the special expediting of Jewish visa applications, allowing about fifty thousand Jews to 
escape in the following two years. American sentiment, however, remained largely 
isolationist. In a 1939 poll, Americans were asked, “If you were a member of congress, 
would you vote yes or no on a bill to open the doors … to a larger number of European 
refugees?” An overwhelming 85 percent of Protestants, 84 percent of Catholics and even 
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25.8 percent of Jews answered “no.”55 In the United States there was little enthusiasm for 
taking in persecuted Jews, and these restrictions on immigration reflected a larger 
movement of isolationism in the United States and a desire to remain outside of European 
politics and alliances. 
American appeasement of Germany stemmed from American isolationism and 
was centered around a desire not to become involved in European wars and politics. 
Isolationism was strong in the United States in the 1930s and had been since the early 
days of the republic, when George Washington warned against becoming entangled in 
foreign wars and affairs in his Farewell Address. Isolationism had played a strong role in 
the United States Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations, which also kept the United 
States out of involvement in the Versailles Treaty.
56
 
American isolationists in the 1920s and 1930s were not uninterested in 
international affairs, nor were they necessarily pacifists; isolationists could be found in 
both political parties and were opposed to “entangling alliances” and collective security 
commitments and international organizations, such as the League of Nations. Isolationists 
did not want the United States to be bound by prior commitments in alliances or 
international organizations—commitments which many believed led to World War I. 
Isolationists were pro army, rather than pro navy, because an army without a navy is 
                                                 
55
 Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 414, 417. 
56
 See John Bledsoe Bonds, Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan (Westport: Praeger, 2003). 
25 
 




Isolationist sentiment in the United States was strong following the First World 
War, and Congress codified this sentiment into the Neutrality Laws, which aimed to 
insulate the United States from potential wars in Europe.
58
 The Neutrality Acts of 1935, 
1936, and 1937, were designed to keep the United States from becoming involved in 
foreign wars by putting an embargo on arms and imposing cash and carry restrictions on 
other strategic goods. These acts severely restricted President Roosevelt from giving aid 
to Britain and France at the beginning of World War II.
59
 The neutrality laws remained in 
effect, even after the German occupation of the Sudetenland, the northern and western 
border regions of Czechoslovakia, in March 1939. Although Roosevelt tried to repeal the 
Neutrality Acts, Congress was unwilling to budge.
60
 
Roosevelt issued two Neutrality Proclamations on September 5, 1939, as 
mandated by the 1937 Neutrality Act. One of the proclamations put an embargo on all 
“arms, ammunition, or implements of war,” including “aircraft, unassembled, assembled 
or dismantled,” as well as “propellers or air screws, fuselages, hulls, wings, tail units 
[and] aircraft engines.” The United States could not aid the Allies in the war through the 
sale or loan of military goods. Roosevelt, however, wanted to support Britain and France, 
and he got to work on repealing the Neutrality Act, which was revised and signed on 
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November 4, 1939. The revision was only a partial victory, however, in that it stated that 
belligerents could purchase arms, but not on credit.
61
 
A majority of Americans did not want to see Britain fall to the Axis powers and 
favored Roosevelt’s plans to aid Britain without going to war. By this time the 
isolationists were becoming a minority, with most people hoping for an Allied victory in 
World War II. Even so, before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 80 percent of 




March 1939 saw the beginning of the end of appeasement, when German troops 
occupied parts of Czechoslovakia and the United States began to apply economic 
sanctions against Germany. The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 seemed 
to many Americans to be a sign that Germany was shifting attention from the West, 
making it less likely that the United States would become involved and strengthening the 
resolve of American isolationists.
63
 However, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
on December 7, 1941, Roosevelt was able to marshal the United States to war not only in 
the Pacific, but in the Atlantic as well. 
Creating the Congressional Mission 
To combat American isolationist tendencies and appeal to the whole nation, the 
groups of congressmen and editors and publishers were selected to include a broad range 
of political beliefs and from a wide geographic disbursement. For the congressmen 
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invited to tour the German concentration camps, the trip was “wholly unexpected.” On 
Thursday, April 19, Eisenhower cabled General George C. Marshall to request a 
congressional committee and a number of prominent editors and publishers to visit 
Buchenwald. He also extended his invitation to the British parliament. Eisenhower cabled 
to Marshall, “[w]e continue to uncover German concentration camps for political 
prisoners in which conditions of indescribable horror prevail…. I have visited one of 
these myself and I assure you that whatever has been printed on them to date has been 
understatement.” 64  Eisenhower “felt that the evidence should be immediately placed 
before the American and British publics in a fashion that would leave no room for cynical 
doubt.”65 Marshall replied on the same day, telling Eisenhower that his “proposal [had] 
been cleared with and approved by the Secretary of War and [President Harry Truman]. 
Plans,” he wrote, “are being formulated and you will be kept advised.”66 
Eisenhower’s expressed desire was for a “delegation from the Congress of the 
United States to see for themselves the real situation before time elapsed and it was 
cleaned up, in order that they might report their true findings to the Congress and to the 
American people.”67 Eisenhower believed that it was important at the time, and for the 
future, “to have firsthand testimony of detached witnesses who were in no way involved 
in propaganda,” which is why leading newspaper and magazine editors and publishers 
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and congressmen were called upon to “observe and to question prisoners and all others 
available in the concentration camps.”68 
According to M. E. Walter of the Houston Chronicle, the editorial trip, suggested 
by Eisenhower and sponsored by the War Department, “was for the purpose of giving the 
editors an opportunity to see things for themselves so that they would have a better 
understanding of the stories being sent back by the correspondents and be able to have a 
more intelligent appreciation of the problems that must be faced in the postwar era,” 
alluding to Eisenhower’s goal of a lasting United States presence in Germany following 
the war. Walter explained also that the trip was arranged immediately following 
Eisenhower’s cable to Marshall, so that the editors and congressmen could see the 
“notorious concentration camps as soon as possible after they had been opened by 
American troops.”69 
On Friday, April 20, one day after Eisenhower cabled Marshall, Marshall’s staff 
was in communication with Congress to form an official committee to investigate 
evidence of German atrocities in concentration camps.
70
 Around noon, two 
representatives from the Office of the Chief of Staff called on Majority Leader of the 
Senate Alben W. Barkley (D-KY) and Speaker of the House of Representatives Sam 
Rayburn (R-TX) to discuss the cablegram that General Eisenhower had sent to General 
Marshall on April 19. Barkley and Rayburn oversaw the selection of twelve 
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congressmen, including Barkley himself, to take Eisenhower up on his invitation.
71
 On 
April 22, the War Department released an official statement concerning the congressional 
delegation: 
At the personal request of General Eisenhower and with the approval of the 
Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, leading members of both Houses of 
Congress will be flown to Germany in Army aircraft within a few days to make a 
personal inspection of conditions of unspeakable horror which exist in Nazi 
concentration camps for political prisoners uncovered by the advance of the 
Allied armies…. [T]he inspection is for the purpose of giving members of 
Congress at first hand a picture of conditions which General Eisenhower says are 




In the letter, Eisenhower requested that a group of twelve congressmen and a group of 
senior magazine and newspaper editors come to Germany to see “the evidence of 
bestiality and cruelty” of the Nazi concentration camps, so that “no doubt [is] left in their 
minds about the normal practices of the Germans in these camps.”73 Concerning his 
request, Geoffrey Parsons Jr. of the International Herald Tribune wrote that it was “a fair 
guess that Eisenhower would not make the request unless he personally had been terribly 
shocked by what he has seen in Germany and felt strongly that information about 
conditions in these German camps should be disseminated as widely as possible in 
America.”74 
Because Eisenhower gave no recommendations as to who ought to make up the 
congressional delegation, it was up to Senate Majority Leader Barkley and Speaker of the 
House Rayburn to decide; they “at once set about to consult with the minority leaders of 
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the two respective Houses,” in order to create a delegation to accept Eisenhower’s 
invitation. The matter of the committee came to Congress too late on Friday for the whole 
of Congress to be consulted in the creation of the delegation, so it was agreed that under 
these circumstances the group “should be immediately named, in order that the mission 
might go forward without delay,” and it was agreed that an equal number of Republicans 
and Democrats from both houses would be chosen for the inspection tour.
75
 It was 
important to include an equal number of both parties and a wide geographical 
disbursement so that the congressional mission to Europe well represented the entirety of 
the American people, giving the largest possible number of Americans representation on 
the committee. 
Because of the nature of the trip and in order to ensure expert opinions, Barkley 
desired representatives from the Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, and Naval Affairs 
Committees, and so Senator Walter F. George (D-GA) and Senator Elbert D. Thomas (D-
UT) were selected, but it was impossible to get Senator David I. Walsh (D-MA), 
chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, as he was out of Washington D.C. for the 
weekend. Eventually, after some urging from the rest of the committee, it was decided 
that Majority Leader Barkley would accompany the delegation in the place of Walsh.
76
 
They decided that the committee should be made up of six members of each house of 
Congress, and that it should evenly represent both the Republican and Democratic 
parties. On the morning of the 21
st
, Minority Leader Wallace H. White Jr. (R-ME) 
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advised Barkley that he was ready to recommend Senators C. Wayland Brooks (R-IL), 
Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA), and Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE) to represent the Republican 
minority. From the House of Representatives, Edouard V. Izac (D-CA), James W. Mott 
(R-OR), James P. Richards (D-SC), Dewey Short (R-MO), Robert E. Thomason (D-TX), 
and John M. Vorys (R-OH) were chosen.
77
 
The congressmen represented both political parties equally and twelve of the U.S. 
states from all regions of the country. The congressmen hailed from a variety of 
backgrounds: many had been lawyers and all but four had served in the First World War, 
representing the Navy, Army, and Marines. Sen. Thomas had been a Mormon missionary 
to Japan in the years before World War I, Rep. Short had spent a number of years in 
Germany as a student at both the Heidelberg University and the University of Berlin, and 
Rep. Vorys had been assistant secretary to the American delegation at the Conference on 
Limitation of Armament in 1921-22 in Washington, D.C., resulting in a series of 
disarmament treaties between nations with interests in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia.
78
 
Because of the diversity of their experiences, they brought a wide variety of perspectives 
to their investigation of atrocities and conditions of the German concentration camps. 
At almost the same time that the congressional group was being assembled, 
leading newspaper and magazine editors and publishers were receiving invitations to tour 
Europe as well. According to Norman Chandler, one of the editors who toured the 
concentration camps, Eisenhower’s reason for asking for such a group was “simple.” 
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Chandler wrote that, “[h]aving seen one of these horror institutions, [Eisenhower] found 
it difficult to believe the evidence of his own eyes. He wanted the American people to 
know that the American war correspondents were accurate in their reports, that this was 
not propaganda but the plain unvarnished truth.”79 Eisenhower’s request for such a group 
was not because he felt the war correspondents had been inaccurate or were reporting the 
conditions of the concentration camps poorly, explained Malcolm Bingay in the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch. Rather, he made the request “as a means of convincing the American 
people that the conditions cannot be exaggerated.” Both the editors and Eisenhower had 
an interest in proving the credibility of the earlier reports on German atrocities. 
Eisenhower’s thinking, according to Bingay, was “as simple, direct and clear as his own 
personality”: he wanted the American people to be assured that the news they were 
reading about the concentration camps were the “plain, unvarnished truth.”80 
General Marshall’s staff selected eighteen editors to follow the congressmen on a 
tour through Europe: Julius Ochs Adler of the New York Times, Malcolm Bingay of the 
Detroit Free Press, Amon Carter of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Norman Chandler of 
the Los Angeles Times, William L. Chenery of Collier’s, E. Z. Dimitman of the Chicago 
Sun, John Randolph Hearst of Hearst Newspapers, Ben Hibbs of the Saturday Evening 
Post, Stanley High of Reader’s Digest, Ben McKelway of the Washington Star, William 
I. Nicholson of the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
81
 Joseph Pulitzer Jr. of the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, Gideon Seymour of the Minneapolis Star Journal, Duke Shoop of the 
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Kansas City Star, Beverly W. Smith of American Magazine, Walker Stone of the 
Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance and Washington Daily News, and M E. Walter of 
the Houston Chronicle. As was the case with the congressmen, the editors were selected 
hastily “on the basis of availability and geographical distribution.”82 
M. E. Walter was a uniquely appropriate choice because he was a World War I 
veteran who had been taken prisoner by the Germans, making him “well equipped to 
make a comparison between the German treatment of prisoners in this war and in the last 
war.” 83  Also selected for the group was former brigadier general and then-general 
manager of the New York Times Julius Ochs Adler, who would provide an expert opinion 
from the military angle.
84
 Norman Chandler was also a wise choice, considering that he 




The Congressional Mission to German Concentration Camps 
On Sunday, April 22, the congressional mission departed from Washington D.C. 
at 11:51 a.m. aboard a C-54 four-engine plane for Paris, via Bermuda and the Azores.
86
 
The delegation arrived at Paris’ Orly Airfield at 7:15 p.m. the following day, Monday, 
April 23,
87
 where they were met by American Embassy, Visitors’ Bureau, and U.S. Army  
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Photograph 1: The congressional mission arrives at Orly Airfield, outside of Paris, France, April 24, 1945. From Left 
to right: (on ground) Rep. Dewey Short (R-MO), Rep. R. Ewing Thomason (D-TX), Sen. Walter George (D-GA), Sen. 
Alben Barkley (D-KY), Rep. James Mott (R-OR), Rep. James Richards (D-SC), Rep. Ed V. Izac (D-CA), (on stairs) 
Sen. Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA), Sen. Kenneth Wherry (R-NE), Sen. C. Wayland Brooks (R-IL), and Rep. John Vorys 
(R-OH). (National Archives RG-111-SC-263972, Box 477) 
representatives, before being taken to the Ritz Hotel in Paris for the night.
88
 At almost the 
same time that the congressmen arrived in France, the group of eighteen editors had 
assembled at La Guardia Field in New York. They departed at 2:30 p.m.
89
 aboard an 
Army Transport Command C-54 bound for Paris by way of Bermuda and the Azores.
90
 
The day after their arrival in Paris, Tuesday, April 24, the congressional group 
flew to Weimar, Germany, where they met and lunched with Brigadier General Frank A. 
Allen Jr., director of public relations of the Supreme Headquarters, before driving to the  
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Photograph 2: Congressmen watch a former prisoner demonstrate how victims were hung on hooks and then clubbed 
to death at Buchenwald, April 24, 1945. From left to right: R. Ewing Thomason, James Mott, Charles Brooks, Kenneth 
Wherry, Alben Barkley, Dewey Short, and John Vorys. (National Archives RG-111-SC-204010, Box 263) 
Buchenwald concentration camp on the outskirts of the city.
91
 The congressmen were 
accompanied on their tour by Brigadier General John M. Weir, Colonels Robert 
Thompson and John Hall, and a group of photographers.
92
 At Buchenwald, the group 
toured the barracks, hospital, and crematorium and met hundreds of prisoners who told 
them about their lives in the concentration camp. The next day, on April 25, the party of 
American publishers also inspected Buchenwald with General Allen and Kurt Gatnor, a 
former high officer in the Austrian army and Buchenwald prisoner, as their guide.
 93
 
While in the camps, the editors “divided into twos and threes and mingled with those who  
                                                 
91
 U.S. Army AG Visitor’s Bureau, “Itinerary of Congressional Group,” 2. 
92
 U.S. Senate, Atrocities, 6. 
93
 Robert Wear, “U.S. Newsmen Leave Paris for Germany,” Houston Chronicle, April 25, 1945, 1; “Editors 




Photograph 3: A group of newspaper and magazine editors views bodies at Buchenwald, April 25, 1945. Retrieved 
from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), http://resources.ushmm.org/inquery/ 
uia_doc.php/photos/5553?hr=null. 
had been freed, slave laborers and civilians of many nationalities.”94 The group “talked 
with the prisoners, checked over the installations … and gathered evidence on a great 
mass of atrocities.”95 United Press War Correspondent Robert Meyer accompanied the 
editors and publishers through Buchenwald. He had visited the camp earlier and told 
them that “the murder factory had been cleaned up considerably.”96 Gideon Seymour, 
vice president and executive editor of the Minneapolis Star-Journal, was fluent in 
German and was able to get stories about Buchenwald firsthand from the prisoners and 
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 On their return flight, they were flown low over Coblenz and Frankfurt, 
which Walter described as being “at least 50 per cent in ruins.”98 
After their visits to Buchenwald, both the congressional delegation and the group 
of editors and publishers requested to extend their visit to Europe. Many of the editors 
said that they were unable to form a full opinion on the extent of German brutality 
because of the limited time they were able to spend in the camp, so they asked “to be 
taken to other German prison and internment camps to obtain a complete picture of 
German treatment of prisoners and internees.”99 Rep. Dewey Short told Congress on May 
16 that after visiting Buchenwald the group decided that they should all remain in Europe 
to see another camp, fearing that people would say to them that Buchenwald was an 
exception to the norm, that it was “all set up.”100 Additionally, both groups hoped to 
inspect other American installations in Europe and to visit and interview American 
soldiers who had been liberated from German prisoner of war (POW) camps.
101
 
The following week, the congressional delegation attended the daily briefing at 
the Twelfth Army Group Headquarters, inspected Allied bomb damage meted out to 
Frankfurt, Bonn, Cologne, and Aachen from the air, and met and lunched with 
Eisenhower at the Hotel Lion d’Or.102 On April 26, the congressional group met and  
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Photograph 4: General Dwight D. Eisenhower greets the congressional mission at his advance headquarters in Paris, 
France, April 25, 1945. From left to right: Ed. V. Izac, Leverett Saltonstall, John Vorys, James Mott, Alben Barkley, C. 
Wayland Brooks, Dewey Short, R. Ewing Thomason, Kenneth Wherry, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. (National Archives 
RG-111-SC-204011, Box 263) 
interviewed French General Charles De Gaulle. According to Senator Saltonstall, De 
Gaulle “talked very objectively about the future of France. He told us [that] in his opinion 
600,000 Frenchmen had been killed, of which approximately 350,000 were in the prison 
camps and slave labor and 150,000 in the armed forces and the balance from bombing 
and other matters.” 103  That night the group dined with U.S. Ambassador Jefferson 
Caffery, and on Saturday, April 28, they met Brigadier General Fenton S. Jacobs, 
commanding general of the Channel Base Section.
104
 The group also inspected reception 
camps and hospitals for liberated prisoners of war and the displaced persons reception 
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center at the Gare d’Orsay, viewed bomb damage at a number of cities in Germany from 




The editors met General Bradley at Wiesbaden for a question and answer session 
on April 25, and the next day, Eisenhower, who spoke “at length on the military situation 
but refused to predict the end of the war.”106 Their meeting with Eisenhower was “off the 
record,” meaning they could not make notes during the meeting, but Pulitzer wrote that 
Eisenhower “talked and answered with astonishing frankness the barrage of questions we 
fired at him. Some of the questions concerned delicate political situations as well as 
military, but to every question he came back with a direct answer.”107 On April 26, the 
editors returned “to Paris for briefing by Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee.”108 In Paris, 
the editors met Parisians and “attended the regular briefing given war correspondents 
twice a day.” 109 They were also given an Army report on Buchenwald prepared by 
Brigadier General Eric Wood and Lt. Colonel Charles Ott, which described the mission 
and structure of the camp, the population at the time of liberation, and the practice of 
taking tattooed human skin for souvenirs.
110
 The editors were also given access to over 
thirteen “volumes of pictures and affidavits complied by the French government  
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Photograph 5: Members of the congressional mission view the V-1 and V-2 bomb factory under the Harz Mountains, 
adjacent to the Dora concentration camp near Nordhausen, Germany, May 1, 1945. From left to right: Leverett 
Saltonstall, Major H. A. Beckley, Major General Wilton Persons, Kenneth Wherry, C. Wayland Brooks, Ed. V. Izac, 
John Vorys, War Dept. Rep. John Weir, Major General L. W. Rocks. (National Archives RG-111-SC-264023, Box 
477) 
regarding atrocities committed in occupied France by the Germans.”111 On April 30 the 
group of editors flew to Brussels, and then drove to Antwerp where they interviewed the 
burgomaster and the governor of the province and inspected the bomb damage before 
returning to Brussels to interview the new prime minister. The editors and publishers also 
flew over the Ruhr and the Rhineland, including Cologne, which Walter observed to be 
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“almost a total ruin.” The group landed near Essen and traveled by Jeep to the Krupp 
works, which had been bombed to rubble.
112
 
On May 1, the congressional delegation toured the Dora concentration camp near 
Nordhausen, where they saw the V-1 and V-2 bomb factory hidden within the Harz 
Mountains. There they were told how the rockets, airplane engine parts, and “other 
munitions of war” were built using slave labor.113 Later they viewed German industrial 
sites that had been destroyed before flying to Heidelberg for the night,
114
 where they 
dined with General Jacob L. Devers, commanding general of the Sixth Army Group. 
After a tour of Heidelberg University, the congressional delegation split into two groups: 
one group flew to Erlangen, Germany, to meet General Patton, and the other, made up of 
Saltonstall, Short, Mott and Izac, flew to Frankfurt, where they lunched with Lt. General 
Alexander M. Patch, Commanding General of the Seventh U.S. Army.
115
 The next day 
the group drove to the Dachau concentration camp, which the Army was able to capture 
“practically intact” because of the speed of the American advance. The “evidence of 
German brutality” was left untouched, awaiting congressional inspection.116 Short and 
Saltonstall rode “all the way [with General Patch] from [his] headquarters down to 
Dachau,” a trip of about 160 miles, during which they saw a “tremendous number of  
  
                                                 
112
 Ibid., 1, 6. 
113
 U.S. Senate, Atrocities, 10. 
114
 Memo by Saltonstall, May 11, 1945, 2. 
115
 U.S. Army AG Visitor’s Bureau, “Itinerary of Congressional Group,” 3; Walker Stone, “Tangled Piles 
of Rotting Corpses Tell Story of Dachau Horrors,” Washington Daily News, May 5, 1945, 8; U.S. Army 
AG Visitor’s Bureau, “Itinerary of Congressional Group,” 3. 
116




Photograph 6: Rep. John Vorys inspects one of the incinerators at the Dachau concentration camp, May 2, 1945. 
(National Archives RG-111-SC-264013, Box 477) 
refugees.”117 E. Z Dimitman described millions of such people who could be seen in 
Europe, “sleeping by the roadside—in a barn—in an empty house—in a bombed-out 
building.” He said that the “roads are filled with people seeking their homes…. You ask 
them—‘where are you going?’ The answer is always ‘home.’”118 
That afternoon, Saltonstall’s group viewed Dachau, the first concentration camp 
to be run by the SS. The Dachau concentration camp was just outside of the small 
Bavarian town of Dachau, only about 12 miles north of Munich, the birthplace of the 
Nazi movement. At Dachau the congressmen viewed the “gas chamber, crematorium and 
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saw piles of dead.” 119  The congressmen “passed by death-laden railroad cars and 
inspected the crematory with its piles of corpses,” before departing from the camp after 
only about thirty minutes. The congressmen were so shocked by the Dachau “death train” 
and body disposal plant that they departed early, leaving little time to interview prisoners 
or inspect the “filthy quarters of [the] 32,000 camp inmates remaining alive.”120 Walker 
Stone of the Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance visited Dachau the following day, on 
April 25, along with the second group of congressmen. Stone wrote that he could not 
blame the congressmen for departing after only half an hour: “[w]e might have departed 
posthaste too had we seen the crematory first. But that came last with us, concluding six 
hours of waking thru camp, talking with the few who could speak English among the 
milling thousands in the compounds.”121 The editors and publishers spent the afternoon—
between four and six hours
122— at the concentration camp, which they observed to be 
even worse than Buchenwald.
123
  
The next day the editors toured Munich and lunched with Major General Charles 
Frederick, commanding general of the Forty-Fifth Division, who was tasked with 
preserving order in Munich. The general “had impounded a supply of Mauser pistols  
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Photograph 7: M. E. Walter, of the Houston Chronicle, tours a barracks building at Dachau, May 3, 1945. Retrieved 
from USHMM, http://resources.ushmm.org/inquery/uia_doc.php/photos/11808?hr=null 
found in a Nazi warehouse and presented each of [the editors] with one.” At 4:30 p.m. the 
press group left Munich for Paris where they dined as guests of General Allen.
124
 
On Friday, May 4, the congressional delegation met with representatives of the 
French Ministry of Justice and the French War Crimes Commission, and two days later 
they flew to London to meet the with the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(UNWCC). The congressional committee reported that both agencies were in the process 
of investigating the concentration camps for themselves at the very time that the 
congressmen were visiting Europe. The UNWCC was headquartered in London and 
represented sixteen of the Allies; at the time of the congressional visit to Europe, the 
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UNWCC was already drafting specific charges against the leaders they viewed as 
responsible for the concentration camp system. The committee reported that they were 
pleased with the ongoing United Nations (UN) and French efforts, and they 




On May 6 the congressional group returned to Paris and from there flew to 
Washington D.C. by way of the Azores and Bermuda, arriving in Washington D.C. on 
the evening of May 8.
126
 The press group left London for Iceland, and, after meeting 
some wounded, returning soldiers, they left for Washington D.C. and arrived the same 
day the congressmen did.
127
  
A number of other groups also took up Eisenhower’s invitation to visit 
Buchenwald: Churchill told Parliament of Eisenhower’s April 20 invitation to send 
number of members of Parliament “at once to his headquarters in order that they may 
themselves have the ocular proof of their atrocities.” Immediately one hundred members 
volunteered for “this grim job”128; Churchill, however, decided that only eight members 
of the House of Commons and two from the House of Lords would travel to the Allied 
Supreme Headquarters, “where General Eisenhower [made] all the necessary  
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Map 1: Sen. Leverett Saltonstall's copy of the itinerary map of the congressional mission, prepared by the U.S. Army 
Visitor's Bureau, April 23 through May 7, 1945. (Massachusetts Historical Society, Leverett Saltonstall Collection, 
Carton 385, Travel File: Germany, 1945). 
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arrangements for their inspection of the scenes of atrocities.” 129  It was considered 
especially important that Mavis Tate, Conservative M.P., accompany the Parliamentary 
delegation, both because she was a woman and “because in 1934 she visited 
concentration camps in Germany and was conducted over a huge camp at Oranienburg.” 
She said of her visit that “everything was done by our guides on my visit to Germany 11 
years ago to make it appear that the camps were run on model lines. Now there will be no 
guides—the mask will be off.”130 
On April 21, the Parliamentary delegation, along with U.S. Representatives Clare 
Booth Luce, Leonard Hall (D-NY), and John Kunkel (R-PA), who were touring the 
European front, visited Buchenwald at around 11:00 a.m.
131
 The members of Parliament 
and Congress were able to extend their visit from one to nearly three hours.
132
 The next 
day, eight more American congressmen, including Rep. Gordon Canfield (R-NJ) and 
Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), all of whom were already in Britain on various 
missions, visited Buchenwald.
133
 One of the eight, Rep. Carter Manasco (D-AL), was 
“still boiling mad” after undergoing the delousing process to protect the group from the 
diseases running rampant in Buchenwald, when he and his party encountered a 
“decorated picture of Hitler plastered on an imposing building.” In true Alabama form, 
Manasco gave the picture “a full mouthful of tobacco-flavored contempt—and scored a 
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bull’s-eye.”134 All told, at least twenty-three congresspersons visited Buchenwald in April 
1945. 
On April 27, twelve members of the UNWCC, including Chairman Lord Wright 
and a number of allied military officials, visited Buchenwald and made a “thorough 
inspection of the camp.”135 The objective of their visit was “to question victims and to 
build legal cases for the trials of those responsible.”136 Wright and the rest of the group 
returned to Britain on April 30.
137
 
The congressional mission, led by Majority Leader Barkley, arrived in Europe 
only three days after receiving Eisenhower’s invitation, and the congressmen, followed 
by esteemed editors and publishers, toured the camps and other sites as representatives of 
the American people to bring back the true story of Nazi atrocities. Their roles as trusted 
agents of the American people, along with their varied backgrounds and broad 
geographical representation, made them an ideal group to tour concentration camps and 
report on the conditions within. Many of the congressmen were skeptical, and, as Rep. 
Short admitted upon return to the United States, “I heard about [German war crimes]. I 
read about it. I saw pictures—but I could not believe it.”138 After standing in the midst of 
the concentration camps and after smelling the stench of the barracks and decaying 
bodies, the congressmen returned home completely convinced that war crimes had been 
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committed, and they were ready to advise Congress and the American public that an 
American presence needed to be maintained in Germany after the end of the war. Seeing 
the conditions of the camps convinced the congressmen that those responsible needed to 
be punished for their crimes; seeing the destruction of Germany convinced them of the 
need to rebuild the country’s infrastructure; and interacting with a population that did not 
recognize any shared guilt for the crimes of the Nazi government inspired them to seek 




Section Two: “Organized Crime against Civilization” 
What the congressmen and editors discovered when they toured Buchenwald, 
Dora, and Dachau was evidence that the Nazis were engaged in “organized crime against 
civilization.”1 They observed that political and racial opponents of the Third Reich had 
been targeted for imprisonment and elimination through deliberate starvation, 
overcrowding, and a variety of other means. Upon their return to the United States, the 
congressmen reported on the conditions and atrocities of German concentration camps to 
Congress and the American public through an official report, interviews, and public 
appearances. 
Evidence of Atrocities 
In their role as expert witness to German atrocities, the congressional committee 
considered three different types of evidence when inspecting the concentration camps: 
visual evidence, prisoner testimony, and “common knowledge” of the concentration 
camps. All three types of evidence were seen or collected by the congressmen firsthand. 
The first two types of evidence are easy to understand: Visual evidence is what the 
congressmen saw during their investigation, including piles of bodies, gas chambers, 
crematoria, and so on; what the congressmen referred to as “prisoner testimony” was 
evidence that individual prisoners had seen with their own eyes and then reported to the 
delegation through interviews and conversations. The third type of evidence is more 
complicated. The congressmen defined “common knowledge” as “evidence of things 
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done in the camp which were not done publicly but which … all prisoners were aware 
of.” According to the congressmen, the prisoners had learned “from custom and 
experience, from … conversation with the guards and amongst themselves, and from the 
very plain and almost mathematical kind of circumstantial evidence,” much about the 
goings on within the concentration camp that. Although they had not seen everything 
with their own eyes, it could be said that they have an accurate knowledge of much of 
what occurred in the concentration camps.
2
  
After interviewing hundreds of prisoners, it was the unanimous opinion of the 
committee that “this third kind of evidence was often as accurate and reliable as the two 
kinds of direct evidence.” As an example of this third type of evidence, the committee 
referenced the torture chamber at Buchenwald. No prisoners actually saw the 
strangulation that occurred there, as all prisoners who entered the execution chamber 
were executed, but the “circumstantial evidence of it was so complete … as to leave no 
doubt.” The committee therefore relied on evidence that “was either actually seen by us 
or reported to us by competent and reliable eyewitnesses or that it is based on 
circumstantial evidence which we have considered to be trustworthy.” During their 
meetings with the many American generals, as well as in briefings, the congressmen were 
given a number of Army documents pertaining to the concentration camps. They chose to 
ignore much of that evidence for their report, save for statistics gathered in a 
demographic report made by the U.S. Army on April 16, which categorized by 
nationality the population of the Buchenwald concentration camp, because they wanted 
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their report to Congress to be based “exclusively upon [their] own personal 
investigation.” They did find, however, that much of the evidence that the Army had 
collected corroborated that which they had seen and heard during their inspection.
3
 
In general, the congressmen “found evidence [in the concentration camps] of the 
‘fiendish and sadistic’ program aimed at all opponents of the Hitler regime.”4 Reps. Short 
and Thomason told the Chicago Sun upon their return that they had “found hundreds of 
dead bodies piled around and scattered promiscuously and thousands still alive who will 
either die or would have died except for their liberation by the American armies.” The 
two continued, telling the Chicago Sun that they 
found this entire program constituted a systematic form of torture and death, 
administered to intellectual political leaders and all others, including Jews who 
would not embrace and support the Nazi philosophy and program. We found the 
extent, devices, methods and conditions of torture almost beyond the power of 
words to describe. They reached the depths of human degradation beyond belief, 
and constituted no less than organized crime against civilization and humanity for 





From the prisoners the congressmen learned that Dachau had opened in 1933 and 
was initially populated with “those who dared to oppose the Hitler regime.” But after the 
Anschluss and the beginning of the war, the concentration camps in Germany became 
much more international. The committee noted that Jews, Poles, and Russians were 
“treated with a greater degree of severity than other nationalities…. We found that a 
colossal scheme of extermination was planned and put into effect against all those in 
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occupied countries who refused to accept the principles of nazi-ism [sic] or who opposed 
the saddling of the Nazi yoke on their countries.”6 
Before the war began, the concentration camps had been populated with political 
prisoners, Communists, liberals, intellectuals, and other anti-Nazis, as well as Jews 
arrested on or after Kristallnacht in November 1978. After the war began, political 
prisoners from all over Europe were sent to these three German camps.
7
 As Walter 
explained, the “[p]risoners in these concentration camps were of two kinds. There were 
first the political prisoners … [and] there were the poor slave laborers brought to 
Germany from the occupied countries.”8 
Duke Shoop explained that there were “two types of prisoners, those able to work 
in the arms factories and farms and those unable to work because of disease or illness”; 
those who worked, he was told, received “twice the daily food ration” of those who did 
not work.
9
 This was especially noticeable at the Dora concentration camp and 
neighboring slave labor factory. Concerning conditions and atrocities at Dora the 
congressmen had relatively little to report, save that the Dora prisoners “had been used as 
slave labor in the underground factory and for work parties in adjacent farms and in 
smaller munitions factories.”10  Rep. Luce told newspapers that approximately 50,000 
prisoners were interned at Dora and they “were dying at the rate of 900 daily when our 
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troops arrived.” According to Luce, “‘the dead and dying were difficult to tell apart in the 
hideous barracks of Nordhausen (Dora).”11  
In their report the congressional committee wrote that the three camps they visited 
were “typical of all the concentration camps in the Reich, and their physical 
characteristics, functions, management, and operation furnish an accurate cross section of 
the entire German political-prisoner camp system and policy.”12 According to the report, 
these concentration camps were places of “incarceration, punishment, and liquidation of 
civilians who were opposed to, or who were suspected of being opposed to, the Hitler 
regime.”13 Indeed, this is generally true of Buchenwald and Dachau, especially before 
1939 and the beginning of the war. Both Buchenwald and Dachau were built to house 
political opponents of the Reich and served only that purpose until the war began. Dora, 
on the other hand, was a slave labor camp and as such was home not only to those who 
opposed the Nazis, but also to many others whom the Nazis forced into slavery.
14
 
By the time that the congressmen arrived at Buchenwald, the camp had been 
occupied by American forces for twelve days and had been significantly cleaned up. All 
of the prisoners who were able to leave had been evacuated, leaving “only about 6,000 
too sick and weak from undernourishment.”15 These prisoners were dying at a rate of 
about twenty per day, according to the American medical officers in charge, and the 
majority, they said, were past saving. Walter wrote that those prisoners who “might 
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escape death in the immediate future were so weakened by their experience that they 
would go through life permanently disabled in mind and body.”16 
On April 16 the U.S. Army determined that that the total number of prisoners at 
Buchenwald was 20,000, of whom 4,000 were Jewish, but by the time the editors and 
congressmen arrived around 14,000 prisoners had been removed, leaving behind about 
6,000 prisoners who were too sick or weak to travel.
17
 The population of the three camps 
was quite diverse. The population of Buchenwald, at the time of liberation, was made up 
of a majority of Russians and Poles and French, but also Hungarians, Yugoslavs, Dutch, 
Belgians, Austrians, Italians, Czechs, anti-Franco Spanish, and almost 2,000 German 
anti-Nazis. No matter their nationality, “[t]heir stories,” according to Dimitman, “were all 
the same – starvation, brutality, disease, degradation and finally, welcome death.”18 Of 
the 3,800 Poles present at Buchenwald when it was opened by the Army, over 1,000 were 
children between the ages of six and fourteen.
19
 
The congressmen described the prisoners of the camp as “the intelligentsia and 
‘leadership’ groups from continental Europe, as well as ‘democratic’ or anti-Nazi 
Germans and their relatives.” 20  The committee described Buchenwald as an 
“extermination factory” in which “starvation, beatings, tortures, incredibly crowded 
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sleeping conditions, and sickness” as well as organized over-work and outright execution 
were used to murder prisoners.
21
  
William Chenery noted in a pamphlet published on June 16 that the lack of Jews 
in the concentration camps was because the camp “program was designed to kill Jews, 
Poles and Russians. Polish Jews seemed to have been worst treated.”22 Shoop noted in the 
Kansas City Star that it appeared that “[a]t first the Russians and Poles were needed in 
the war factories and farms adjoining the prison camps. But as they became ill from 
overwork and undernourishment they were left to die, their corpses cremated in big 
ovens.” Concerning the women of the concentration camps, Shoop wrote that most of 
them were “forced into prostitution” to service “prisoners who worked hard and earned 
merit awards”; once the women became sick they were murdered. 23  Walker Stone 
estimated that the Dachau camp “might decently have accommodated 3000,” but the 
population during the war ranged from 8,000 to 10,000, and when the U.S. Army 
liberated Dachau on April 30, the camp population exceeded 40,000.
24
 
The parliamentary delegation concluded that “a policy of steady starvation and 
inhuman brutality was carried out at Buchenwald,” and the editors observed that the 
population of Buchenwald resembled “human skeletons wandering in a daze around the 
huge camp.”25 The grotesque appearance of the prisoners remained vivid in the minds of  
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Photograph 9: Members of the congressional mission view the hospital at Dachau, May 2, 1945. From left to right: C. 
Wayland Brooks, R. Ewing Thomason, Alben Barkley, and Brig. General Frank Allen. (National Archives RG-111-
SC-263990, Box 477) 
the editors. William Nicholson reported that the patients in the Buchenwald hospital were 
“living skeletons, dying from all types of diseases and starvation,” so weak that they 
could not even crawl over their bunk mates for food. “The haunted expression in these 
patients’ eyes,” he wrote, “reminds you of a beast which has remained caught in a steel 
trap for days before being killed. The look in the eyes of these prisoners … is something 
that will bring such a deep impression into your brain it will never be erased.”  The 
patients, he explained, were still dying at a rate of about thirty per day. They were so far 





 Julius Ochs Adler reported that many had starved to death 
and that he had seen their bodies “piled in squares with 20 to 25 bodies in each square…. 
Their legs above the knees had shrunk to the dimensions of an average man’s wrist. Their 
faces showed the agony in which they had died.”27  
The general prisoner population, Walter reported, were dying at half the rate of 
the hospital patient rate—fifteen per day, even though it had almost been two weeks since 
the Army opened the camp. The prisoners were sick and starving, most of them past 
saving, and although Army officers assured the press group that much had been done to 
clean the camp and improve the conditions, it was still “a place of degradation and 
filth.”28 
 The congressmen reported that prisoner rations generally consisted of about 
“one-half a pound of black bread per day and a bowl of watery soup for noon and night, 
and not always that.”29 American surgeons, reported Joseph Pulitzer Jr., explained that 
many of the adult corpses weighed between sixty to eighty pounds, “having in practically 
all cases lost 5 per cent to 60 per cent of their normal weight.”30 The camps swarmed 
with lice and vermin, disease was common, and those who did not die of disease or 
torture died the long, slow death of starvation. The congressmen found no evidence that 
the German people were wanting for clothing or food, however: “The contrast was so 
striking that the only conclusion which we could reach was that the starvation of the  
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Photograph 10: Senate Majority Leader (and future vice president to Dwight D. Eisenhower) Alben Barkley views 
corpses at Buchenwald, April 24, 1945. (National Archives RG-111-SC-204745, Box 266) 
inmates of these camps was deliberate.”31 In an April 28 dispatch from Paris, Adler 
agreed with the congressional delegation that the German civilians in the nearby areas 
appeared well-fed and well-clothed, untouched by war or want.
32
  
All of the prisoners Walter spoke with “agreed on the inadequacy of the rations, 
which consisted almost exclusively of substitute coffee, weak soup and a small piece of 
bread daily.” Walter wrote that most of the prisoners who arrived at the camp arrived 
“half starved or worse” after making the trip to the camp on foot on in crowded trains 
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with “practically no food.”33  An April 29 article in the Kansas City Star quoted the Ott 
and Wood report on Buchenwald in saying that “starvation complicated by hard work, 
abuse, beatings and torture, and incredibly crowded sleeping conditions” were some of 
the ways Nazis killed prisoners.
34
  
In Dachau, Walter reported, “the prisoners in the most distressing condition were 
… those who had been brought to the camp in the last few weeks … [including] 4000 
brought down from Buchenwald on a 21-day railroad trip with only a couple of potatoes 
and a piece of bread for nourishment.” Of those 4000, 1300 were dead on arrival and the 




The “death train” sat at the far end of the SS section of the camp and had arrived 
from Buchenwald, bringing trainloads of prisoners to Dachau in an attempt by the SS to 
flee the advancing Allied Armies. By the time the train had arrived at Dachau, most of 
the prisoners were dead or dying of starvation and exposure.
36
 The fifty-car train was full 
of corpses, just as it was when it was discovered by the army. In each of the train cars 
“the floor of the car was covered with dead, emaciated bodies. In some of the cars there 
were more than enough to cover the floors.” They were advised by Army officials that “at 
least 100 of these civilian prisoners had been jammed into each car—locked in—and they 
had been on the road for several days without food or water and that approximately 3,000  
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Photograph 11: Members of the congressional mission view the crowded sleeping conditions at Buchenwald, April 
24, 1945. From left to right: John Vorys, Brig. General John Weir, Colonel William Williams, Alben Barkley, C. 
Wayland Brooks, and Leverett Saltonstall. (National Archives RG-111-SC-204013, Box 263) 
of them were dead upon arrival and most of the others were in a dying condition.” The 
congressional report described dead bodies surrounding the train cars; people who had 
“apparently crawled out of the cars and had died on the ground.” Near the train they saw 
three dead SS guards, whom they were told were killed by Russian prisoners.
37
 It was the 
rail cars overflowing with dead that shocked the Army soldiers the most, reported 
Pulitzer. The sight of it so “enraged our troops when they overran the camp that they 
showed no mercy whatever for the German guards and troops who were still to be 
found.”38  
                                                 
37
 U.S. Senate, Atrocities, 12. 
38
 Pulitzer, “A Report,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 20, 1945, 1D, 4D. 
62 
 
The committee report also described the housing conditions for the prisoners in 
the Buchenwald barracks, hospital, and the “little camp,” reserved for new prisoners, 
prisoners undergoing punishment, and Jews. In all three, prisoners were crammed 
together: In the little camp there was about thirty-five cubic feet of space for each man, 
well under the 600 required by U.S. Army regulations. Prisoners in the little camp also 
received less food per day than other prisoners and the death rate was about fifty persons 
per day. In the regular barracks each prisoner was allotted about 85 cubic feet of space 
and slept in a 30 by 72 inch bunk, with less than one “thin, shoddy, and undersized” 
blanket per prisoner, meaning that many prisoners had to share. The hospital was “a 
building where moribund persons were sent to die.” There were no medicines to treat the 
rampant typhus and tuberculosis, and the prisoners slept in similar cramped conditions as 
the regular barracks. At the time of the congressional visit, the death rate in the hospital 
barracks ranged from five to twenty persons per day.
39
 The congressmen found that, in 
general, the prisoners were “herded together” in wooden barracks that would have been 
too small for “one-tenth of their number.” They slept on “wooden boards in tiers of two, 
three, and even four, sometimes with no covering, sometimes with a bundle of dirty rags 
serving as both pallet and coverlet.”40  
According to the congressional report, all three camps were run by the SS and 
Gestapo, acting under orders from their superiors with a wide discretion given for the  
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Photograph 12: Rep. John Vorys views the Dachau barracks on May 2, 1945. (National Archives RG-111-SC-264012, 
Box 477) 
methods they were to use to control the prisoner population.
41
 Short and Thomason 
explained the concentration camp Kapo system to the Chicago Sun, describing it as a 
system wherein the Nazi guards would assign “some of the punitive duties to the 
prisoners, especially the habitual criminals who had charge of the barracks.”42 Different 
groups of prisoners, Walter observed, were set against one another; as when formerly 
active Russian Communist prisoners were placed in charge of 1,000 clergymen at 
Dachau.
43
 According to M. E. Walter, the Russian prisoners “delighted in persecuting the 
clergy.” One of the clergymen interviewed by the editors said that he had been in the 
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camp since September 1941. He reported that the prisoners had been treated as badly by 
the collaborating Kapo prisoners as they had been by the SS.
44
 
While touring Dachau the editors witnessed an attack by the former prisoners on a 
Dachau Kapo. They were told that “[s]everal of these collaborationists already had been 
killed by irate prisoners and many others are slated for punishment,” including an 
Armenian, who had been beaten to death by a gang of prisoners. “The Nazis,” Walter 
astutely observed, “took advantage of these [European] prejudices, kept them alive and 
fanned them into flames.”45 They exploited existing prisoner animosities to keep the 
prisoners from finding solidarity in their shared suffering. Chenery explained it as “one of 
their tricks, using prisoners to make other prisoners miserable.”46 
One unique aspect of Dachau was that it was the camp where most of the Catholic 
priests detained by the Third Reich were held. German Priests at Dachau received special 
privileges for the first few years, but after Easter, 1942, priests had to work in Dachau.
47
 
Chenery reported that the German priests “arose at 4 a.m. and worked until 7 p.m.” 
Polish priests worked too, but they were also subject to various other tortures. “The 
Polish priests were used as test animals in medical experimentation,” Chenery explained. 
“One hundred and seventy of them were infected with malaria to test the efficacy of 
certain antimalarial drugs.”48 At Dachau, a priest told Stone that “Polish priests [were] 
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immersed in water of a sea temperature to determine how a Nazi aviator or sailor might 
be expected to live if he by war hazard were dumped into the sea.”49 
This unique form of torture and murder was also conducted at Buchenwald. 
Dimitman reported that the editors “saw the medical experiment chamber but no evidence 
was present. Prisoners told us [that] Army authorities confirmed that here vivisection was 
practiced on humans—also, but undocumented, that typhus injections were given.”50 
Another torture the prisoners were subjected to, especially at Dora, but also at 
Buchenwald and Dachau, was over-work as slave laborers. Prisoners at Dora were 
worked in quarries and factories until they were no longer viable for labor. The 
congressmen accurately noted that “[w]hen the efficiency of the workers decreased as a 
result of the conditions under which they were required to live, their rations were 
decreased as punishment. This brought about a vicious circle in which the weak became 
weaker and were ultimately exterminated.”51 The Fort Worth Star-Telegram quoted Rep. 
Luce, who said that the Dora prisoners were “slaves who could be counted upon to take 
the secrets of the diabolic weapons upon which they worked into the burning kilns with 
them … slow starvation made it certain that they should all, in the end, die on the job.” 
She dramatically told Congress that “[i]t remained for the Nazis to hit upon this terrible 
device of using the blood and fat of men to stoke secret furnaces and fire secret weapons, 
a sheer fuel oil, and when it was used up, to scrap the human containers.”52 
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On May 3, two days after her return to the United States, Luce presented evidence 
of atrocities before congress. She described the Nazi policy of death by starvation that 
she witnessed in Buchenwald, as well of the “beatings, burnings, hangings, clubbings, 
foul mutilations, and massacres” practiced in the camps. Luce explained that “[n]o 
American … even in jail, protected from infamies by a commonly held code of decency, 
can imagine what grisly tortures were visited upon some of the prisoners for the smallest 
infraction of the camps’ inhuman disciplines.”53 
The basement below the Buchenwald crematorium was the “strangling room,” a 
cement cellar into which prisoners were tossed by way of a thirteen foot cement shaft. 
Should a prisoner not die from the fall, they were “garroted, with a short double-end 
noose, by SS guards and hung on hooks along the side walls, about 6½ feet above the 
floor.” Along the wall, the congressmen saw evidence of about forty-five or fifty hooks.54 
William Nicholson explained that “[c]ondemned prisoners were forced to stand upon a 
small box. Then the box was removed and the prisoner was suspended by a thin wire 
until he slowly strangled to death.”55 Pulitzer explained further that, the “Nazis, when 
they hanged offenders, so conceived their gallows or hanging hooks, that way the 
victim’s neck was never broken.” Should the prisoner strangle too long without dying, 
Pulitzer said, “the guard would club him to death with a wooden club which I have held  
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Photograph 13: Members of the congressional mission view the gas chamber, disguised as a shower, at Dachau, May 
2, 1945. From left to right: Kenneth Wherry, C. Wayland Brooks, John Vorys, and James Richards (U.S. Army officers 
unidentified). (National Archives RG-111-SC-204838, Box 266) 
in my own hands.”56 The committee reported that approximately sixty to eighty prisoners 
were murdered in this fashion per day.
57
 
Julius Ochs Adler reported in his dispatch from Paris on April 28, that what he 
had witnessed in Germany was “worse than any battlefield.” In Buchenwald, according to 
Adler, some 32,705 people had died since July 1937. “Some were tortured and died under 
torture. Some were flogged to death. Some were strangled. Some were drained of their 
blood and murdered. Some died as a result of medical ‘experiments.” 58  Leverett 
Saltonstall recalled in his notes that the congressmen “were told by a Dutch doctor [at 
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Dora] about men being hung or shot or how they worked them until they died. 135 were 
hung with others standing at attention.”59 
The gas chamber at Dachau stood out as one of the most distinguishing features to 
visiting congressmen. It was located in the center of the crematory building, built of 
concrete. On two opposite walls of the chamber were airtight doors, one of which the 
condemned prisoners would enter through, the other through which their naked corpses 
would be removed. The congressmen estimated that the chamber was large enough that 
about one hundred prisoners could be executed in one gassing. On either side of the gas 
chamber were warerooms, where the bodies of the executed prisoners would be placed to 
await cremation. “At the time we visited the camp,” the congressmen wrote, “these 
warerooms were piled high with dead bodies.” In one room the bodies were stacked 
neatly “like cordwood,” in the other there was an irregular pile of corpses; all of the 
bodies were naked. “The stench indicated that some of them had been there for several 
days.”60  
The Dachau crematorium was attached to “[o]ne of the worst death traps seen by 
the party”: a gas chamber disguised as a shower.61 The New York Times reported that 
Gideon Seymour described the gas chamber as: 
[A] room about 30 or 20 feet square, with twenty-five rows of perforated pipes 
overhead. There were not water connections to the showers, but instead the pipes 
were supplied from the same gas pipes that led to the crematorium chambers. The 
prisoners who were doomed to die would be brought in, provided with towels and  
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Photograph 14: Rep. John Vorys (right) investigates a room filled with bodies at Dachau with Maj. General Wilton 
Parsons (left), May 2, 1945. (National Archives RG-111-SC-264011, Box 477) 





Whether or not the Dachau gas chamber was actually used for the mass murder of 
prisoners is not entirely clear; however, the general consensus of Dachau historians is that 
the chamber was built too late for it to be of practical use before the liberation of the 
camp. Former Dachau prisoner and Auxiliary Bishop of Munich Dr. Johann Neuhäusler 
wrote that construction of the Dachau gas chamber “was begun in 1942, but as a result of 
‘sabotage’ by the prisoners it was not finished until 1945,” so the gas chamber was 
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“never set in action in Dachau. Only the dead were brought to the crematorium for the 
‘burning,’ not the living for ‘gassing.’” Neuhäusler explains that thousands of Dachau 
prisoners were in fact gassed, but that they were taken to Austria to be murdered at 
Hartheim, near Linz.
63
 Dachau historian Stanislav Zámečník agrees that the chamber was 
not used for mass murder, but suggests that it was tested and that prisoners were 
murdered in the tests. He also argues that Sigmund Rascher, one of the Nazi doctors who 
worked at Dachau, used the gas chamber “for experiments with combat gases.”64 Of 
course, for the visiting congressmen and editors, the state-of-the-art gas chamber 
disguised as a shower, flanked by two rooms full of dead bodies, would have appeared to 




Behind the crematory building was an enclosure where execution by shooting was 
carried out. It was divided into three sections, each separated from the other by three-
foot-high wooden fences. One section was for political prisoners, one for women, and the 
last was for “prisoners of distinction,” including those with military records (these 
prisoners were not prisoners of war, but political prisoners who had served in earlier 
wars). These prisoners of distinction were buried in wooden coffins, while the bodies of 
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The bulk of the prisoners who died, however, were cremated in one of the 
elaborate concentration camp crematoriums, which were often attached to the primary 
location of prisoner murder. At Buchenwald, Dimitman reported that the body disposal 
plant was “the nicest place in the camp. Modern, it was the only brick building in the vast 
expanse that held as many as 53,000 political prisoners at one time.” The crematorium at 
Dora, it was estimated, could cremate up to two hundred prisoners in a day, and Walter 
reported that, according to the estimates of American engineers who examined the 
crematoria, the capacity of the Buchenwald and Dachau crematoria was double that of 
Dora—up to four hundred bodies in a twelve hour day, which was about two percent of 
the Buchenwald population at the time of liberation.
67
 At the Buchenwald body disposal 
plant, gold fillings were removed from corpses before they were placed into one of the 
firebrick, coal-powered incinerators, each with a capacity of three bodies. The 
incinerators were located a short elevator ride away from the “strangulation room” in the 
basement. The body-disposal plant was, according to the congressmen, a model of 
“German industrial efficiency.”68 
For persons who died “natural deaths,” that is, any death within the camp that was 
caused by disease or starvation, and not outright murder, the committee report revealed 
that each morning the prisoners “were required to strip and bring to roll call the naked 
bodies of all comrades who had died during the previous 24 hours.” A truck would then  
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Photograph 15: Members of the congressional mission view bones and human remains in the Buchenwald 
crematorium, April 24, 1945. Alben Barkley (foreground), Ed V. Izac, John Vorys, Dewey Short, C. Wayland Brooks, 
and Kenneth Wherry. (National Archives RG-111-SC-204745, Box 266) 
drive around the roll call square to collect the bodies and take them to the crematorium.
69
 
In Dachau, according to Stone, “[d]eath was apparently the route out of the camp. The 
crematory was very efficient, so much so that the dying in other camps were shipped to 
Dachau.” He reported that between 1933 and 1942, 34,000 prisoners had died of “natural 
deaths.” Stone wrote that 1,600 prisoners died in 1943, “4800 in the year 1944 and 
13,000 in the first four months of this year before liberation May 1.”70 
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When the American forces arrived at Buchenwald, the camp had run out of coal 
and an estimated 1,800 bodies had built up in front of the disposal plant. By the time the 
congressional committee had arrived on April 24, most of the bodies had been buried, but 
even then a truckload of about sixty bodies sat before the crematorium, and piled on the 
ground near the truck were an additional twenty-five bodies.
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During their tour of Buchenwald, the pressmen and congressmen also witnessed 
one of the more contentious Nazi atrocities, both at the time and in today’s literature: 
tattooed human skin that had been tanned and saved as souvenirs for the SS. Dimitman 
reported on April 28 from Paris that the group “saw a room full of dying prisoners. They 
were nothing but bones ready to be stripped of their skins for lampshades—that is, if they 
were tattooed. The Elite Guards (SS) made nicely tattooed skin into Lampshades.”72 The 
Kansas City Star also reported on the tattoo collection, citing the Wood and Ott report, 
which declared that accounts of the use of tattooed “human skin as souvenirs by SS 
personnel were ‘true in every respect.’” The newspaper continued to quote the report:  
The wife of one of the SS officers
73
 started a fad that any prisoners who happened 
to have extensive tatooing [sic] of any sort on his body was brought to her and 
that if she found the tatooing [sic] satisfactory the prisoner was killed and skinned 
and that the skin with the tatooing [sic] was then tanned and made into souvenirs 
such as lampshades, wall pictures, book ends, etc., and that about forty examples 
of this artistry were found in the SS officers’ quarters. This statement was 
confirmed by Lieut. Walter Emmons. And we ourselves saw six examples at 
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Photograph 16: Former Buchenwald prisoners exhibit human remains and artifacts, including the shrunken heads of 
two Polish prisoners who attempted to escape, and tanned human skin with tattoos. April 16, 1945. Retrieved from 
USHMM, http://resources.ushmm.org/inquery/uia_doc.php/photos/19348?hr=null 
 
The tanned human skins were found alongside shrunken heads and human organs in the 
commandant’s quarters. Shoop reported in the Kansas City Star, that Ilse Koch, wife of 
Commandant Karl Koch, “made a hobby of tattoos.” The story the editors heard from 
many of the prisoners was that “whenever she noticed an unusual design on a prisoner 
she arranged to add the human skin to her collection.” She had the prisoner killed, and 
then the tattooed skin was tanned and made into a souvenir, such as a lampshade, knife 
75 
 
sheath, or a wallet.
75




The reports of the tanned human skin souvenirs are contentious, and many 
disagree as to their veracity. Eugen Kogon, an eminent scholar of the Nazi concentration 
camp system, writes that tattoos were originally collected at Buchenwald to support camp 
medical officer Erich Wagner’s doctoral dissertation on tattoo markings, and that the 
skins were then put on display for exhibit to SS visitors. “The practice got to be so 
popular among the SS,” writes Kogon, “that [SS captain] Müller received detailed 
suggestions about it from Berlin,” and later hundreds of such specimens were sent to 
Berlin at the request of the chief concentration camp medical officer, SS Colonel Lolling. 
Müller even helped to prepare souvenirs such as “penknife cases and similar articles from 
human skin.”77 
The evidence connecting Ilse Koch to the tattoo collection is, however, more 
tenuous. Though witnesses at Koch’s trial testified that she had two lamp shades made 
from human skin, along with a photo album, briefcase, a pair of gloves, and book covers, 
there is no direct evidence to connect the items to Koch, and it is more likely that Koch 
simply took an interest in the dissertation prepared by Wagner. Either way, Koch’s 
brutality in other areas of the camp earned her a spot on the docket of the Dachau Trials, 
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lasting from June 30, 1945, when she was accused by the American military courts in 
Dachau, to January 15, 1951, when she was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.
78
 
One of the most important observations that the congressmen made concerning 
the network of concentration camps that they investigated was in their conclusion. The 
congressmen noted that though each of the camps the committee visited “differed in 
some details, they were all of the same general pattern and design and administered for 
the same purpose.” In each of the three camps they found four general classifications of 
prisoners: political prisoners, “habitual criminals,” conscientious or religious objectors, 
and the workshy—those imprisoned for failure to work. The committee noted that the 
camps “all carried into effect the same pattern of death by hard labor, starvation, hanging, 
strangulation, disease, brutality, gas chambers, gallows, and filthy and unsanitary 
conditions, which meant inevitable death eventually to every imprisoned person.” Each 
camp was guarded by the SS, and in each camp, prisoners, usually “habitual criminals,” 
were assigned duties within the camp to help keep the other prisoners in line.
79
  
A Sordid and Fantastic Story 
Upon his return the United States on May 3, Rep. Hall, who viewed Buchenwald 
with Luce and the Parliamentary delegation, said that although the photographs of 
Buchenwald were “revolting in every respect,” he believed they needed to be shown to 
the American people. “Even the pictures,” continued Hall, “cannot show the cruelty and 
depravity of a people who treat human beings as the German people treated those in their 
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detention camps.”80 Senator Jackson was quoted by the Boston Daily Globe as saying, 
“[w]e heard atrocity stories from the last war which were not verified, but now we have 
seen them with our own eyes and they are the most sordid I have ever imagined.”81 
Norman Chandler said in a United Press interview that “[a]fter the last war people 
were inclined to kiss off atrocity stories as propaganda. The thing that impressed me most 
was that the actual sight was worse than any atrocity story. What we saw proved our own 
reports during this war told the absolute truth without exaggeration. The things we saw 
could not be exaggerated.”82  
Dewey Short told Congress on May 15 that, although the reports from the 
correspondents and the accompanying photographs did not lie, after seeing the atrocities 
firsthand he recognized that they were unbelievable and unknowable without real, solid 
evidence: “it is next to impossible to believe them. The whole and sordid story is so 
fantastic that it is beyond human comprehension.”83 Though photographs and eventually 
newsreels depicting the scenes at many of the concentration camps were being seen by 
many Americans in late April and into May, for the congressmen and editors who visited 
the camp, nothing made the scenes more “true” or “real” than the stench of the camps. 
Rep. Short told Congress: “Dachau has been a nightmare to me and I now almost 
faint when I think of it and the reeking stench of dead men. Oh, you cannot get the 
picture. You have to move and walk in the midst of all that—and touch it, and feel it, and 
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smell it.”84 “The official report,” Short continued, “was understatement … rather than 
exaggeration…. I nearly fainted, not on one, but on several occasions. These dirty, filthy, 
shabby barracks, the squalor and stench of bunks where men slept on bare boards.”85 So 
gruesome was the sight of the barracks that Short, a grown man who had fought in the 
First World War, was willing to admit that he had been overwhelmed by the scene.  
Walker Stone wrote in the Washington Daily News that the citizens of the small 
town of Dachau claimed that they knew nothing of what went on inside the concentration 
camp. “Their organs of smell,” he suggested, “must be numb.”86 When Stone described 
Buchenwald on May 5, he wrote that he was most disturbed by the “sickening stench of 
thousands of dead and the sight of tangled piles of emaciated and rotting corpses.” 
Despite the atrocity of the scene, Stone recognized that the camp must have been much 
worse when liberated by the Allies, as it had been under American control for ten days, 
during which time they worked to clean the camp.
87
 Duke Shoop, of the Kansas City 
Star, also commented on the number of bodies still at Buchenwald: “we saw bodies; 
bodies and the living dead. Bodies in piles on the ground, in pits, on flat cars, in trucks.”88 
Malcolm Bingay, Seymour, Dimitman, and Walter told America from France that 
the “stories of systematic starvation and torture of the political prisoners have not been 
exaggerated. Dachau was even worse than Buchenwald.”89 In his article for the LA Times 
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titled “Stories of Nazi Prison Horrors Substantiated,” Norman Chandler wrote that there 
was no need for him to go into gory detail about the camp; the details had all been told by 
correspondents. “My purpose [in this article] is merely to testify as to the accuracy of the 
American correspondents—they have told the truth. They have not exaggerated. 
Exaggeration, in fact, would be difficult.”90 
The congressmen who visited Buchenwald on April 23 reported that “the 
evidence of Nazi atrocities committed there exceeded the wildest flights of imagination.” 
Rep. Gordon Canfield “declared the evidence bore out everything that had been said or 
written about Nazi brutality,” and after returning from Europe, Senator Wherry told the 
Houston Chronicle that the stories that war correspondents had been reporting “were not 
exaggerated”; the congressional delegation had seen the strangulation room and evidence 
of murder there. He told the paper, “[w]e saw the emaciated bodies. We saw the 
crematories.”91 Senator Saltonstall spoke with the Daily Globe in an interview that was 
published on May 16. He told the Globe that the photographs and films that were shown 
in newspapers and cinemas were “not fake.”92 Dimitman reported that the horrors of the 
concentration camps had thus far been accurately and truthfully reported by American 
correspondents. The story of Buchenwald, he wrote, “was told in the American style of 
reporting—factually and objectively.” But, he opined, “[t]hat is not the way a story such 
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as this should have been written. It should have been written in anger and with 
indignation.”93 
Some of the congressmen and editors reported that there were scenes in the 
concentration camps which were “too gruesome” to describe. Shoop reported that, 
overall, SS methods for murder “ran the gamut from deliberate starvation and routine 
beatings to sadistic tortures too horrible and too perverted to be publically described.”94 
The reality is, between the photographs, newsreels, and detailed reports by war 
correspondents and the congressmen and editors who visited the camps, the concentration 
camps were quite well described. By labeling some camp scenes as “indescribable,” 
however, the congressmen and editors were calling upon the power of the imagination of 
the American public to fill in the story. People who never visited the camps would never 
know the “stench,” but they could imagine it. Labeling some scenes as indescribable also 
allowed the congressmen and editors to call upon the power of propaganda without using 
actual propaganda. The public read over and over about the conditions of the camps and 
then read that there was even more to them, instances so terrible that they could not be 
repeated in polite company—but what could be worse than a collection of tanned human 
skin? or the image of a man hanging from a wire around his neck, strangling to death in 
the basement of a crematorium? These are the questions that the congressmen and 
publishers wanted Americans to ask themselves.  
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A Program of Extermination? 
According to the congressional report, the concentration camps were places of 
“incarceration, punishment, and liquidation of civilians who were opposed to, or who 
were suspected of being opposed to, the Hitler regime.” While not an accurate assessment 
of the entire concentration camp system, their evaluation of the camps they visited was 
more or less accurate. Their observations ceased to be accurate when they concluded their 
report by writing that the camps they witnessed were part of a “calculated and diabolical 
program of planned torture and extermination.”95 Here, the congressmen were confusing 
reports of a Nazi policy of extermination with the camps that they had visited. Their 
confusion is entirely understandable, considering the incredible quantities of dead 
produced by Buchenwald, Dora, and Dachau, but it is still inaccurate to claim that these 
three camps were part of a systematic extermination program. 
Immediately following their seizure of power in 1933, the Nazis began to arrest 
and oppress their political opponents within Germany. Violence between Nazis and 
Communists had been common during the mid-to-late 1920s and the early 1930s. The 
two groups fought in the newspapers and in the streets, but after Hitler assumed the 
chancellery on January 30, 1933, the tenor of that violence changed. Once in power, the 
Nazis began arresting outspoken German Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, and 
liberals. Many were detained for “re-education” in the new German concentration camps. 
In March 1933, the concentration camp system was reorganized. Locally run camps were 
incorporated into a camp system run by Hitler’s private army, the SS. Under Oberführer 
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Theodore Eicke, rules and regulations for the system were codified at Dachau, the first 
SS concentration camp. The concentration camps inside of the pre-1939 German borders 
were created to hold political prisoners and supply slave labor to the Third Reich, not as 
part of the extermination program later carried out in occupied Poland. The dramatic 
condition of the camps when the congressmen visited them can be attributed to the Soviet 
push into Poland. Camps in Poland, such as Auschwitz, had been abandoned by the 




That the congressmen misunderstood the nature of the concentration camps is 
entirely understandable; since the liberation of Majdanek by the Soviets in June 1944, 
word of a Nazi extermination program had spread. When the congressmen saw the piles 
of dead, the gas chambers, the emaciated and diseased condition of most of the prisoners, 
they assumed that what they were witnessing was the Nazi program of elimination, rather 
than the gruesome result of the German concentration camp program. To them it must 
surely have appeared to be a scheme of extermination, but the thousands dead at Dachau 
and Buchenwald pale before the numbers killed in the so-called “final solution”: 900,000 
Jews murdered at Auschwitz-Birkenau, roughly 1,584,500 Jews killed at the other killing 
centers in Poland—Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor, and Chelmno; and 1,350,000 Jews 
estimated to have been killed by mobile killing units in the East. The scale of murder at 
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Buchenwald, Dora, and Dachau was incredible, but does not approach the final solution 
as carried out in occupied Poland.
97
 
Norman Chandler claimed that through starvation, over work, abuse, beatings and 
torture, crowded conditions, and murder, “many tens of thousands of the best leadership 
personnel in Europe, including German democrats and anti-Nazis, have been 
exterminated,” which is accurate to a point. The anti-Nazis and other political opponents 
were not necessarily in camps to die; they were there for re-education, and it was 
acceptable if they died. Shoop recalled that on each of their forays into Germany he did 
not see one Jewish person. “Jews,” he wrote, “were shot, garroted, hanged or gassed,” 
and Chandler reported that the Jews in the camps had received the worst treatment, but 
that “the atrocities were all-encompassing.” 98  Shoop was entirely correct in his 
observation, and Chandler’s statement is partially true—Jews in the concentration camps 
had definitely received the worst treatment; in fact, they were targeted for extermination. 
That the atrocities were “all-encompassing,” however, is a simplification. Yes, all 
concentration camp prisoners had difficult lives, but as Primo Levi points out, some 
prisoners had more tolerable conditions than others. The reality is that each prisoner had 
a different experience within the concentration camps, save those prisoners who were 
sent immediately to their deaths at killing centers such as Birkenau, Treblinka, Majdanek, 
and Sobibor.
99
 Simply put, the congressional and editorial groups that toured the 
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concentration camps in April and May 1945, did not witness the Holocaust, they only 
thought they did. 
Although the congressmen were inaccurate in reporting that they had visited 
places of prisoner “extermination,” the congressmen reported the “truth” about the 
concentration camps, so far as it appeared and was reported to them. Their mistake lay in 
the fact that they let news of an extermination program color their interpretation of what 
they witnessed at Buchenwald, Dora, and Dachau. Their mission to the camps was a 
success in that they returned to the United States ready and willing to maintain a military 
presence in Germany as long as was necessary to re-educate the German people, try the 
Nazi criminals, and rebuild Germany as a functioning member of Europe. Though they 
were wrong about the program of extermination, their reports to Congress and the 
American public succeeded in helping to create a political climate in the United States 
that was accepting of the need to maintain an American presence in Germany. 
Concentration Camps versus Prisoner of War Camps  
Another object of confusion, however, the congressmen and editors were able to 
clear up. In an effort to clarify, as well as to calm the families of soldiers captured 
overseas, the editors made sure to note the difference between German concentration 
camps and POW camps. As early as April 21, 1945, the day after General Marshall’s 
office contacted Congress to invite the congressional mission, Senator Albert “Happy” 
Chandler (D-KY) and Rep. Overton Brooks (D-LA) “joined in drafting a resolution 
calling for appointment of a War Atrocities Commission to look into ‘the Axis 
85 
 
annihilations far below the level of animal cruelty.’” 100  Chandler introduced the 
resolution in the Senate, and Brooks presented it to the House of Representatives on 
Monday, April 23.
101
 At that time, there was still confusion in America as to what the 
purposes of concentration camps were, and the resolution they drafted authorized the 
President of the United States to appoint a permanent or semi-permanent commission to 
“examine and keep a record” of Nazi crimes against Americans and Allied prisoners of 
war.
102
 Chandler and Brooks mistakenly believed that American prisoners of war were 
being held in the concentration camps on which the war correspondents were reporting. 
This inaccuracy was well addressed by both parties who toured the camps at 
Eisenhower’s request. “Buchenwald,” wrote Walter, “should not be confused with the 
prison camps where American soldiers were kept. This camp was for political prisoners 
… who had opposed the Nazis or, as they phrased it, were ‘politically unstable.’”103 
Walter explained in another article that U.S. soldiers, though poorly fed and subjected to 
long marches, “were generally treated fairly well,” and the editors heard of “only a few 
cases of outright brutality.”104 On May 9, the New York Times also clarified that “[t]he 
atrocities at Dachau and Buchenwald did not involve Americans … our soldiers suffered 
mostly from lack of food and long marches.”105 “Compared with the pitiful creatures in 
the [Dachau] concentration camp,” Walter wrote in the Houston Chronicle, American 
prisoners “seemed almost normal in mind and body even though most of them were 
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around 30 pounds underweight.” 106  Joseph Pulitzer assured the Missouri House of 
Representatives that the camps were for political prisoners only and that no Americans 
were held in any of the concentration camps he visited.
107
 
On May 15, Walter wrote that only a few of the U.S. former prisoners of war 
complained of brutal treatment. They “had been forced to do heavy work and make long 
marches on very inadequate rations,” but otherwise, he reported, the regular German 
army followed the rules of warfare in their treatment of prisoners of war.” He did note 
that conditions worsened for Americans in German prisons around January 1, 1945, as 
the Allies were closing in on Germany.
108
 
The distinction between prisoner of war camps and concentration camps was an 
important one for the congressmen and editors to make for two key reasons: The 
newspapers at that time were full of articles about the grotesque conditions of the 
concentration camps, and many Americans, especially families of POWs, needed to be 
assured that American prisoners were not being subjected to the same conditions as were 
political prisoners. Additionally, by divorcing the POW camps from concentration 
camps, the congressmen and editors were lessening the potential for a retaliatory peace. 
Had American POWs been tortured in the same way that concentration camp prisoners 
were, Americans might have been less willing to engage in re-education and rebuilding 
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and more desirous of a harsh, punitive peace, akin to the peace that followed the First 
World War. 
Walter, a World War I veteran and former German prisoner of war, found “little 
similarity between the government headed by the Kaiser and that headed by Hitler insofar 
as treatment of prisoners is concerned.” He wrote that he had been treated well as a 
German prisoner during the last war; he recalled that the “food was poor but so also was 
the food of the native population.” Because of that experience, he had doubted the reports 
and horror stories that had come back about the prisoner camps of Nazi Germany. But 
when he saw the concentration camp at Buchenwald he wrote that, in comparison, “the 
prison camps I was in in 1918 were de luxe [sic] hotels.”109 Walter wrote that he “was 
impressed chiefly by how dirty [Buchenwald] was.” He compared the conditions of 
Buchenwald to the conditions of the prisoner of war camp he was interned in during the 
First World War, noting that those older camps were much cleaner and less crowded.
110
 
After the presentation of the report to Congress, Joseph L. Hill (D-AL) asked if 
the congressional mission had visited any POW camps, to which Barkley replied that 
they did not, but that they “saw hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoners of war … who 
had been liberated and released as our armies marched forward. We talked to them by the 
hundreds concerning the conditions which they found in prisoner-of-war camps.” Their 
“greatest complaint was lack of food.”111 
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Photograph 17: Members of the congressional mission interview Colonel Paul Good, from Corvallis, OR, who was 
captured by the Germans at Omaha Beach on D-Day and liberated from Stalag 7A, Moosberg, Germany, May 3, 1945. 
Left to right: James Richards, Kenneth Wherry, C. Wayland Brooks, John Vorys, Maj. General J. A. Van Fleet, 
Colonel Good, and Maj. General Wilton Persons. (National Archives RG-111-SC-231234, Box 360) 
After the tours of Buchenwald, both groups returned to the Weimar airfield, 
where they met and spoke with a group of liberated Allied prisoners on their way to 
France.
112
 On April 25, the congressmen visited camps for returned prisoners of war,
113
 
and the following day they visited the Displaced Persons Reception Center operated by 
the French at the Gare d’Orsay and the 48th U.S. General Hospital, where they met 
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liberated American prisoners of war.
114
 Also on April 26, the editors toured a Recovered 
Allied Military Personnel (RAMP) camp and a camp for German prisoners of war.
115
 
Saltonstall wrote that there they “saw the embarkation camp [about forty miles 
from Le Havre air field], which was divided into three parts, --the receiving, the 
processing and those who were ready to go,” and from there they drove to RAMP Camp 
Lucky Strike to interview liberated prisoners of war. In Paris the group was briefed by 
Brigadier General Eric F. Wood, chief of the Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons 
Division and the U.S. Group Control Commission.
116
  
The following day they flew to Le Havre to visit Camp Wings, “where recovered 
Allied prisoners of war [were] brought after being liberated. Then [the congressmen] 
drove to Camp Lucky Strike, 40 miles to [the] northeast, where American liberated 
prisoners [were] being prepared for return to the United States.” They interviewed many 
of the soldiers, “all of whom,” observed Walter, “were in good spirits and rapidly 
regaining weight.” On another evening, the editors visited the repatriation center for 
liberated French prisoners of war.
117
  
Part of this confusion stemmed from the fact that Army censors were having 
difficulty passing along stories of the prisoner of war camps. “The censors … contended 
that unfounded exaggerations might be printed, provoking the Germans to retaliate [and] 
that undue anxiety would be created among prisoners’ relatives.” As of April 21, the 
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policy on censoring POW reports was relaxed, and war correspondents could “report 
what they see, but still cannot write of what liberated Americans tell them, if severe 
cruelty is involved.”118 These measures were designed, at least in part, to protect Allied 
prisoners of war from German retaliation, but as more and more POW camps were 
liberated and the tide of the war turned dramatically against the Germans, such fears lost 
importance. 
Reporting on Atrocities and other Conditions 
About one week after Germany’s unconditional surrender, on May 15, 1945, after 
the roll was called at noon, Senate Majority Leader Alben W. Barkley came forward to 
the well of the Senate Chamber to address the Senate. Standing before the Senate, he read 
uninterrupted the report that he and the other congressmen had drafted concerning the 
atrocities and conditions of German concentration camps.
119
 
The tenor of the congressional report was scholarly in tone and emotionless. 
Though many of the congressmen gave emotional and even vengeful reports to 
newspapers and in speeches, their report to Congress was professional, scientific, and 
devoid of emotion. The scholarly tone of the report was due to the congressmen’s desire 
to appear to be detached, expert witnesses. The congressmen avoided strong, colorful 
language in order to maintain their position as expert witnesses to Nazi atrocities. The 
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following day, Rep. Short spoke to Congress more passionately, commenting on how 
difficult it was to believe his own eyes when faced with the concentration camps.
120
 
In Britain, less than a week after their visit to Buchenwald, the parliamentary 
delegation gave their report to Parliament. Backed with “gruesome exhibits,” the ten 
members of Parliament prepared a “purely factual account minus adjectives or 
moralizing” of the Buchenwald concentration camp, in which “they disclosed that several 
of them had wept and one had fainted at the scenes of brutality.” 121  The evidence 
collected by the Parliamentary delegation was presented to both houses of Parliament as 
Buchenwald Camp: The Report of a Parliamentary Delegation.
122
 The object of the 
delegation, as stated in their report, was to find the truth of the crimes of the Nazis “while 
the evidence was still fresh,” and “to test the accuracy of the reports already published.” 
To do so, the members examined only that evidence which was still visible at the 
camp.
123
 On April 28, the Times of London described the Parliamentary report as “a 
restrained factual presentation of evidence of brutality collected on the spot,” and 
sections from the report were reprinted in the paper.
124
 On May 3, Rep. Luce introduced 
into the Congressional Record the Parliamentary report on Buchenwald, and sections of 
the report were also printed in the Washington Post, along with some other details about 
the Parliamentary visit to the camps. Moreover, the Wood and Ott report on the 
                                                 
120
 79 Cong. Rec., 4672 (May 16, 1945). 
121
 “Untitled” Huston Chronicle, April 23, 1945, 8. 
122
 “The Horrors of Buchenwald,” Times (London), April 28, 1945, 2. 
123
 Buchenwald Camp, 3, 7. 
124
 Horrors of German Camps,” Times (London), April 28, 1945, 3. 
92 
 
conditions of Buchenwald was reprinted in both the Chicago Tribune and the Kansas 
City Star on April 29, 1945.
125
 
On May 15, the Christian Science Monitor, Boston Daily Globe, Houston 
Chronicle, Kansas City Star, Minneapolis Star Journal, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and 
Chicago Sun all reported to the nation that Congress had heard Barkley present the 
group’s findings to Congress. On May 16 the story was carried by the Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, LA Times, New York Times, and the Washington Post. Of all the newspapers 
investigated for this study, only the Times of London, Times-Picayune, and Washington 
Daily News did not report on the description of atrocities and conditions to Congress. 
Between April 15 and June 1, over two hundred articles concerning the concentration 
camps were published in the above fourteen newspapers, and many were accompanied by 
photographs of the camps and the liberated prisoners. 
Although the congressmen reported to the newspapers in a relatively limited 
capacity, reserving their report for Congress,
126
 the newspaper and magazine editors and 
publishers filed report after report, sending a flurry of articles back to America from 
Europe, and publishing even more upon their return to the United States.
127
 While abroad, 
Adler sent a dispatch from Paris on April 28, and on the night of May 4, at 12:15 a.m. 
(6:15 p.m. EST), Malcolm Bingay, M. E.  Walter, E. Z. Dimitman, and Gideon D. 
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Seymour broadcast a report about their visits to Buchenwald and Dachau through the 
National Broadcasting system in the United States.
128
 
After their report was read before Congress and entered into the Congressional 
Record, many of the congressmen then felt free to speak and write more about what they 
experienced and learned during their sojourn through Europe. Senator Saltonstall spoke 
with the Daily Globe in an interview that was published on May 16.
129
 In the days 
following their return, many of the congressmen gave short statements to the United 
Press, which were carried in other newspapers.
130
 
Many of the editors and publishers wrote numerous articles for their papers or 
magazines; Joseph Pulitzer Jr. was especially prolific after his return to the United States, 
authoring a number of “Report(s) to the American People” in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
E. Z. Dimitman presented his findings before “friends of the Chicago Sun,” and later 
printed a pamphlet titled Lest We Forget! that included his address as well as a dispatch 
he had sent from Munich on May 3. William Chenery published a long article in 
Collier’s, the magazine he edited, telling of the editorial tour of the camps, and Clare 
Booth Luce penned an opinion piece for the magazine Prevent World War III, in which 
she called for a harsh peace with Germany.
131
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In addition to the reports they filed with Congress and in the newspapers, many of 
those who toured the concentration camps spoke publically and privately about what they 
saw in German concentration camps. On Sunday, May 13, Senator Saltonstall addressed 
the graduating class of Smith College in Northampton, MA. He told the assembled 
graduates that “[w]ords of mine can never begin to bring home to you the systematic 
form of torture imposed upon the political and other prisoners in some of the prison 
camps in Germany.” In his address he did not go into specifics about the atrocities of the 
camps; he did, however, call for the punishment of Nazi leaders and lauded American 
participation in the United Nations as a way to protect the “physical security and the 
future of opportunity in life for the American people.”132 In his speech to the women of 
Smith College, Saltonstall advocated exactly what Eisenhower had hoped the 
congressmen would encourage upon their return: the need to remain involved in 
international politics following the end of the war. 
Gideon Seymour spoke at a public meeting at the Minneapolis Auditorium on 
Sunday May 12, at 8:00 p.m. and gave a presentation he titled “A Report on Europe,” 
“based on his personal observation of German atrocities,” and M. E. Walter addressed the 
Minneapolis Elks Club on Tuesday May 15 at 8:00 p.m. and discussed his recent 
inspection of German concentration camps.
133
  
E. Z. Dimitman spoke before friends of the Chicago Sun at the Palmer House 
Hotel on May 16, 1945. Much of what he said echoed what he and the others had already 
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published in the papers concerning the concentration camps.
134
 On Thursday May 17, at 
1:30 p.m., Joseph Pulitzer addressed the Missouri House of Representatives “in response 
to an invitation extended by the house, by unanimous vote.” 135  Pulitzer “gave an 
eyewitness account of the horrors of the concentration camps.” 136  Pulitzer’s address 
before the Missouri House of Representatives was broadcast on a number of Missouri 
stations, and was rebroadcast twice the next day by three different stations.
137
 
Norman Chandler addressed “almost 1000 friends [of the Los Angeles Times] in 
the Biltmore Bowl” on Friday May 18, where he told them of “Nazi political prison camp 
atrocities.” 138  Listening to Chandler on Friday were political leaders, high-ranking 
military officers, business executives, educators, clergymen, and “leaders of all walks of 
life,” including the mayor of Los Angeles. Chandler’s presentation was broadcast on two 
different radio stations later that day.
139
 
The largest and most widely-reported public event was held at Carnegie Hall, on 
May 22, 1945, by the Society for the Prevention of WWIII. The event featured Senators 
Alben Barkley and Leverett Saltonstall, Representatives Dewey Short, Ed Izac, and Clare 
Booth Luce, as well as Joseph Pulitzer Jr. The principal speakers at the event were two 
former German prisoners, Sargent Milton Felson, an American who spent a year and a 
half in German prisoner of war camps, and Mrs. Alfred B. Spanjaard, a native of Holland 
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and survivor of the Belsen concentration camp. According to the Los Angeles Times, 
“[s]wift and drastic punishment of German war criminals was advocated by members of 
both houses of Congress, by American newspaper editors and other persons.”140 
According to Alvin Goldstein of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the most dramatic 
speaker that night was Mrs. Spanjaard. “The audience at Carnegie Hall,” wrote Goldstein, 
“listened in almost breathless silence as she told in accented English of the almost 
unspeakable cruelties visited by the German invaders on her neighbors and later on her 
and her family.”141 Dr. Guy Emery Shipler, editor of the Churchman, chaired the meeting 
and the speakers were welcomed by Mayor Fiorello La Guardia.
142
 
What Should be Done with Germany? 
At the same time that the congressional committee was being formed to go to 
Europe, Representative Daniel Flood (D-PA), a member of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, announced that he would offer a resolution in Congress on Monday, April 23 
to send a committee to “leave at once for Germany ‘to visit the death houses and prison 
camps and get firsthand information.’” Flood requested such a mission because he 
believed that “Congress should see to it that all of the facts are brought out,” and that the 
American people needed to know what had gone on in the camps.
143
 Instead, as a 
congressional mission had already departed, Flood introduced a resolution in the House 
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of Representatives that called for the creation of a commission with investigating powers 
to examine claims of Nazi atrocities and report on them to the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, which did not have investigation powers, and Rep. Ed Gossett (D-
TX) introduced a resolution that would ensure that legislation be passed to punish war 
criminals. Gossett’s resolution also called for the publication of an official report of war 
crimes and atrocities so that history would “not repeat itself in the nonpunishment [sic] of 
war criminals or in failure to preserve and publicize authentic records of war crimes.”144 
After their meetings with the war crimes commissions in London and France, Barkley 
reported to Congress on May 15 that the congressional mission was pleased with the 
actions both commissions were taking, and recommended against the creation of an 
American crimes commission, as the UNWCC had the task well at hand.
145
 
In their report to Congress, Barkley and the rest of the congressional mission 
concluded that the Nazi policies in the concentration camps “constituted no less than 
organized crime against civilization and humanity and that those who were responsible 
for them should have meted out to them swift, certain, and adequate punishment.” Having 
reached that conclusion, the committee then addressed the burgeoning UNWCC and the 
French War Crimes Commission. The committee reported that both agencies were in the 
process of investigating the concentration camps for themselves at the very time that the 
congressmen were visiting Europe.
146
 The Allied War Crimes Commission, run by the 
United Nations and headquartered in London, represented sixteen of the Allies and was 
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already drafting specific charges against the leaders they viewed as responsible for the 
concentration camp system. While abroad, the committee was able to confer with both 
the War Crimes Commission in London and the French Commission in Paris. In answer 
to legislation proposed in their absence that addressed the need to investigate war crimes, 
the committee reported that they were pleased with the ongoing UN and French efforts 




Joseph Pulitzer Jr. suggested a different solution when he spoke at the Carnegie 
Hall rally. Pulitzer declared that “every member of the Gestapo, every member of the 
S.S., all German industrialists and financiers and the entire German general staff should 
be shot.” 148  Pulitzer estimated that “this might involve the execution of possibly 
1,500,000 individuals.” According to the New York Times, Pulitzer declared that the 
guilty “should be put out of this world with Army bullets through their heads.”149 E. Z. 
Dimitman reported from Paris during the tour of Europe that “Buchenwald concentration 
camp is the answer to the ‘soft-peace’ boys and girls, the ‘forgive-and-forget’ brigades, 
the let’s kiss-and-make-up’ delegations, the appeasers in America and all the native 
Fascists who term themselves isolationists and nationalists.”150 In a call to action, Pulitzer 
said that the United States needed to “de-Nazify and demilitarize Germany,” and should 
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the United States not take such action, it was his opinion that “this war will have been 
fought in vain.”151 
Dewey Short, speaking at Carnegie Hall “heatedly and with an orator’s fervor,” 
recommended that the high command of the Wehrmacht and all SS and Gestapo 
personnel, save those “forced to join in the last months of the war,” be executed.152 Short 
also advocated for German recovery and re-education, calling for a “strong state in 
central Europe,” not because he felt “any love for the Germans,” but for the self-defence 
of the United States.
153
 Alben Barkley warned against delaying punishment, calling for 
“swift, certain and adequate” punishment of German war criminals.154 Pulitzer, Short, 
Barkley, and Izac all recounted their observations of the atrocities and conditions of the 
concentration camps in Germany and agreed that “severe punitive measures and long 
supervisional [sic] processes were mandatory.”155 In Chandler’s opinion, the peace terms 
that the United States would offer Germany “cannot be too severe,” and Rep. Mott 
suggested that the Allied nations ought to let the German people “suffer just a little” and 
that the Gestapo and SS ought to all be executed.
156
 
Rep. Izac, who had been a prisoner of war in Germany during the First World 
War, told reporters on May 10 that he was “convinced the German people must be 
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subjected to harsh terms or they may decide ‘war is a good thing after all.’” He advocated 
confiscation of the properties and goods of the German people and “distributing them to 
the peoples whose own farms and homes were striped by the Nazi armies.”157 
Rep. Luce, who returned to the United States on May 1 from a two-month long 
tour of the European battle fronts,
158
 told the New York Times that “[d]eath, destruction, 
starvation, disease, political chaos,” which were to her mind indescribable, would only 
become worse in Europe before it got better. “Only the presence of Allied troops in 
Europe,’” Luce claimed, “brings the least semblance of order.”159 Luce believed that as 
part of keeping order, harsh peace terms would need to be given to Germany.
160
 Norman 
Chandler told the friends of the Los Angeles Times at the Biltmore Bowl that General 
Eisenhower had told him and the other newsmen that “the German people must be 
watched and dominated for many years to come.”161  
On their trip the congressmen and editors met and saw hundreds of Germans, 
many of whom claimed not to know what occurred within the concentration camps, many 
of whom claimed to have not supported Hitler. They came home knowing that Germany 
needed rebuilding and re-education, not just punishment for war crimes. 
In addition to punishing with Nazi war criminals and re-educating the German 
people after the end of the war, the Allies needed a plan to for the whole of Germany. By 
1945, two diametrically opposing plans had been created. One, authored by Henry 
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Morgenthau Jr. and supported in principle by both the French and Soviets, was to 
deindustrialize Germany and break the nation into a series of smaller states. The other, 
created by U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and his staff and favored by the 
British and President Truman was to rebuild Germany and use it as an industrial engine 




During their tour of the concentration camps, the congressmen and editors 
discovered that what the war correspondents had reported back to America had indeed 
been true: the Germans had committed war crimes on an astonishing scale—what the 
congressmen called “organized crime against civilization and humanity.” The 
congressmen reported that all three of the camps they visited “were all of the same 
general pattern and design and administered for the same purpose,” to torture and 
exterminate political and racial opponents of the Third Reich. These goals, they found, 
were met through overwork, starvation, unsanitary conditions, disease, and murder.
163
 
They determined, after seeing that the German people were both well fed and clothed, 
that the conditions in the concentration camps were not due to material shortages, as 
conditions in POW camps had been during the First World War; rather the terrible 
conditions in the concentration camps were deliberate. Paul Wooton articulated this point 
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clearly: the harsh conditions of the Nazi concentration camps were not the by-product of 
war, but part of a “deliberately calculated policy of the Nazi leadership.”164 
All three of the liberated concentration camps visited by the congressmen and 
editors were near urban centers, but the people of the towns of Dachau and Nordhausen 
and the city of Weimar clamed to know nothing of the goings on of the concentration 
camps. According to Chenery, the people of the Bavarian city of Munich, only twelve 
miles away from Dachau and site of the failed Nazi Putsch, or coup, to seize power in 
Germany on November 9, 1923, claimed “to know nothing of the bestial cruelties and the 
scientific murders practiced during twelve years at Dachau. The people of Weimar … say 
they did not know what was happening at Buchenwald. In all probability they did not 
know the details. Visitors were not allowed.” Chenery gave the civilian populations near 
the camps the benefit of the doubt, accepting that they probably could not “have done 
anything to improve the condition or the treatment of the men in the concentration 
camps,” recognizing that the concentration camps were used to “imprison Germans 
feared or distrusted by the Nazis. In truth, the Nazis appeared to have destroyed or 
intimidated into silence any possible political opposition in Germany.”165 This raises the 
question of who in Germany was guilty. 
According to Chenery, the German people were not, as a whole, guilty of war 
crimes. He explained that they almost had no choice but to be silent and not interfere, lest 
they wind up in a concentration camp themselves. For M. E. Walter, a former German 
                                                 
164
 Wooton, “Atrocity Camp Visits Praised,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 14, 1945, 7. 
165
 Chenery, “I Testify,” Collier’s, June 16, 1945, 28. 
103 
 
POW from World War I, the conditions of the concentration camps indicated that “the 
[Germans had] deteriorated in character in the 27 years since the last war.”166 Walter saw 
the concentration camps as evidence of a change in the entire German character, not just 
that of the leadership. But were all Germans to blame? When the congressmen and 
editors returned from their trip, many made recommendations about who they considered 
to be guilty and how they should be punished: Representatives Thomason and Short told 
the Chicago Sun that an estimated 4,400,000 members of the Gestapo and SS were guilty 
of war crimes and should be killed.
167
 Joseph Pulitzer Jr. told the Missouri House of 
Representatives that German General Staff was “the guiltiest of the German war 
criminals.” Pulitzer divided the war criminals into four separate groups: “the Gestapo, the 
S.S., the German financiers and industrialists, and the German general staff,” for whom 
he advocated imprisonment or death. In a call to action, Pulitzer said that the United 
States needed to “de-Nazify and demilitarize Germany,” and should the United States not 
take such action, it was his opinion that “this war will have been fought in vain.”168 
Acting on Allen Dulles’s 1942 suggestion that a tribunal made up of men from 
Allied and neutral nations should examine evidence of Nazi violence after the war, the 
UNWCC had been created in 1943, and by autumn the UNWCC had begun to compile 
lists of accused war criminals.
169
 By January 1945, advocates of a trial, rather than 
summary executions, had gained the upper hand, and preparations for a trial of major war 
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criminals moved forward. On April 2—while the congressmen were touring Germany—
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson agreed to lead the European war crimes 
prosecution effort, and on May 2 President Harry S. Truman appointed him Chief of 
Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. By the end of June, the British, French, 
and Soviet governments had agreed to a “Great Powers” trial of criminals, and they sent 
representatives to London to meet and begin formulating a trial plan.
170
 Despite 
differences in legal procedure between the four countries, there was remarkable 




 Nuremberg defendants were tried on at least one of four counts: 
Count one was conspiracy to prepare and execute the substantive crimes enumerated in 
counts two, three, and four. This count divided the judges more than the rest, because 
France, the USSR, and Germany did not have conspiracy laws in their criminal law, and 
so the charge confused them. Count two was crimes against peace and waging wars of 
aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and 
assurances (e.g., breaking the Nazi-Soviet pact). This count was a creation of the courts 
and the Allied Powers and new to international law. Count three was for violations of the 
traditional laws of war, mistreatment of prisoners of war, murder, and devastation not 
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justified by military necessity. Lastly, count four was for crimes against humanity, which 
included actions from before the war.
172
 
The lesson that the Americans broadcast to the world after the trial was that the 
Allies had discredited the Third Reich at Nuremberg by acting virtuously rather than 
summarily executing the prisoners. This message flooded the media in occupied 
Germany and was reinforced by the opinion of the majority of the defense counsel, who 
seem to have felt that the trial was fair and the verdict moderate.
173
 By sentencing the 
prisoners to different types of punishments for varying crimes, the court ensured that 
future “belligerent leaders [would not be] in a situation where the only alternatives for 
them are victory or death.”174 The execution of all of the guilty defendants would have 




At the end of World War II, victory over an “evil ideology” inspired a mission for 
the victors: the evils of the Nazis needed to be wiped away from Germany. Like the 
congresspersons and editors and publishers, the leadership of all four victorious powers 
wanted to re-educate the Germans to get rid of the Nazi taint. Additionally, many in the 
West believed that there needed to be re-education of the Germans if the country was 
going to become democratic.
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After their trip abroad, the congressional delegates returned to the United States 
ready and willing to maintain American involvement in post-war Germany. Many of 
them publically called for the re-education of the Germans in addition to the punishment 
of war criminals. War crimes trials and re-education were, however, only two aspects of 
the post-war Europe that Generals Marshall and Eisenhower envisioned. Although many 
of the congressional delegates, editors, and publishers wanted a “harsh” peace, they had 
seen many of the bombed-out German cities and they trusted Marshall and Eisenhower, 
who recommended rebuilding Germany and economically re-integrating Germany with 
the rest of Europe. The congressmen were ready to support whatever Marshall and 
Eisenhower had in mind for Germany; from their meeting with him, they knew him to be 
fair and that he did not want vengeance or retribution, but a just peace. 
Both Generals Marshall and Eisenhower knew that if the United States was to 
continue its presence in Europe after the end of the war, the U.S. Army would need the 
funds to do so. As enumerated in the United States Constitution, Congress held the purse 
strings for the U.S. budget, and so Eisenhower called for congressmen to see Germany. 
The main focus of their trip abroad was the concentration camps, but the congressmen 
also flew over and toured bombed-out cities and destroyed factories to see the extent of 
the destruction in Europe. 
After seeing the destruction in Europe and considering the failed peace after the 
First World War, the congressmen and editors were convinced that rebuilding needed to 
occur and that Germany needed to be reintegrated into the European community. With 
that same goal in mind, General Marshall and his staff devised the European Recovery 
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Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, which made European self-help possible. 
The Marshall Plan did not necessarily create stability and success in Europe; however, it 
created a place in which stability and success could develop by facilitating essential 
imports, easing production bottlenecks, encouraging growth in capital, and helping to 
suppress inflation.
177
 On April 2, 1948, when the Marshall Plan passed in both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate, six of the twelve congressmen who toured Europe in 
April and May 1945 voted “yes” on the resolution. Three of the representatives who 
toured Germany were no longer present in the House for the vote, and Rep. Richards did 
not vote either for or against the resolution; of the senators, only Brooks and Wherry 
voted against the bill.
178
 
The Marshall Plan was designed to reduce the barriers to the flow of goods, 
services, and capital between the European states and to permit natural market 
mechanisms to promote integration. It was also supposed to organize European 
institutions to transcend national sovereignties and coordinate policies so that normal 
market forces could operate; this would bring once-rival states into a single unit of 
economic and political power.
179
 
In a way, the Marshall Plan can be viewed as an extension of President Woodrow 
Wilson’s unrealized post-World War I plans to rebuild and rejuvenate a war-torn Europe 
by reintegrating Germany economically with her neighbors. The Marshall Planners 
wanted to bring Germany into a wider Western European framework and reconcile its 
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recovery with the security and economic needs of its neighbors and the United States. 
The French were the greatest resisters in the West, calling for a policy that harkened back 
to the French policy of 1920, which called for limits on the German military and 
reparations payments for damage done during the war. As in 1920, America traded 
concessions on reparations for financial aid.
180
 
For the U.S. government, the rebuilding and reindustrialization of Germany and a 
strong line against the growing threat of the USSR took precedence over the punishment 
of Nazi supporters and denazification, and so denazification was sacrificed in favor of 
German economic recovery.
181
 Because of these priorities, the denazification of Germany 
and the reeducation of the Germans was, by 1949, a failure. Many former Nazis and Nazi 
collaborators continued to hold political and economic power in western Germany, and 
most Germans chose not to face their Nazi past, a position that would last until the next 
generation and the Auschwitz trials in the 1960s, during and after which the German 
people increasingly faced and recognized their Nazi past.
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By 1947, American soldiers, policymakers, and the public had transformed their 
image of Germans from villains to victims. In this transformation, the relationships that 
GIs developed with individual Germans played an important role. Americans began to 
see the Germans as victims of potential USSR takeover and victims of material shortages. 
This victim-rescuer relationship was solidified by the Soviet blockade of Berlin from 
                                                 
180
 Ibid., 18, 20. 
181
 Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 165. 
182
 Rebecca Wittmann, Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 5, 6. 
109 
 
June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949, and the food airlift program that the United States 
responded with; after that point, the Soviets had taken over the role of villain and the 
Germans became the victims.
183
 
In the post-World War II period, fears of Soviet expansion led the State 
Department and the Pentagon to match military commitments to economic aid. Western 
leaders believed that they needed Germany as a bulwark against the USSR—they saw 
Stalin’s plans for Germany as part of a larger desire for European hegemony.184 By 1947, 
many of the Western powers favored a gradual unification of the four zones of Germany, 
and Marshall was pushing to begin rebuilding Germany.
185
  
When the congressmen and editors returned to the United States from Europe, 
they helped to create a political climate at home that was conducive to maintaining an 
American presence in Germany after the war. The congressmen and editors helped to 
convince Americans that without trials, denazification, and the recovery of Germany, a 
third world war was inevitable. The congressional mission to the concentration camps in 
April and May 1945 was a success: it helped to encourage a political climate that made 
the Nuremberg Trials, denazification efforts, and the Marshall Plan possible. Although 
denazification ultimately failed, the Nuremberg Trials set a precedent that domination or 
death were not the only two options available for governments that began wars, and the 
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Marshall Plan ensured West Germany a place in Europe, allowing it to become one of the 
primary stabilizing countries in the region and an anchor for today’s European Union. 
By the end of May 1945, the findings of the congressional and editorial missions 
to Germany had been widely published and presented to the American public. Many 
newspaper articles had been written, William Chenery had published his pamphlet, the 
Congressmen had made their report to Congress, and both editors and congressmen had 
spoken publically about the atrocities and conditions in the German concentration camps. 
Additionally, in May the army released footage of the concentration camps in a series of 
films screened for the American public. Short, twenty-minute newsreels about the camps 
were played before feature films, and according to a Gallup poll published on May 20, 84 
percent of Americans considered the “reports of Nazi killing and torture [to be] 
authentic.” Of those polled, 60 percent either wanted to see or had seen the films of the 
concentration camps, 87 percent of the public wanted the films to be shown to all German 




General Dwight D. Eisenhower had hoped that the congressmen and editors 
would in educating the public, helping them to know that the war crimes charges against 
the Germans were legitimate. He hoped that Congress would be convinced that the 
United States needed to maintain a presence in Germany after the war to rebuild the 
country, re-educate the Germans, and prosecute the war criminals. His goals were 
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realized following the war: the public believed the war crimes charges because reputable 
persons backed the reports of the war correspondents The visual evidence of film and 
photographs complemented the trusted word of the congressmen and editors and 
publishers; the American government embraced the European Recovery Program, 
designed to help the European nations recover from the war and reintegrate Germany into 
the European community; and the American public and government supported the 
international trial of major war criminals at Nuremberg.  
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Notes on Photographs and Map 
All of the above photographs were obtained from the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, MD or from the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) website. All of the photographs obtained from 
NARA were taken with a digital camera and had to be cropped of surrounding content 
using Adobe® Photoshop®; in some cases, small portions of the photograph were lost. 
The original photographs were sepia toned and were made black and white using 
Photoshop®. All photographs were taken by the United States Army Signal Corps, and 
Signal Corps identification numbers are given for all photographs except those obtained 
from USHMM, which did not provide that information. 
The map of the congressional visit was obtained from the Leverett Saltonstall 
Collection at the Massachusetts Historical Society. It too was photographed using a 
digital camera; that photo was cropped using Photoshop® so that only the map is visible. 
The map was printed on yellowed paper and the copy of the map was made black and 
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Appendix 1: Eisenhower’s April 19, 1945 request for a congressional mission to view 




Appendix 2: United States Army Visitors’ Bureau Itinerary of the Congressional 
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